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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : Case No. 20050678-CA 
AZHARN ALFATLAWI, : 
Defendant/Appellant : 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to its transfer 
from the Utah Supreme Court. Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(4)(a) (2002), 78-2a-3(2)0) 
(2002); (Record on Appeal [hereinafter "R."] 336.) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Issue 1: Whether Mr. Alfatlawi's attorney provided effective assistance when he 
failed to: (1) explore potential juror bias, and then failed to exercise a peremptory 
challenge even after challenging the juror for cause; (2) minimize the prejudice certainly 
caused by Mr. Alfatlawi's teardrop tattoo, which typically implies a history of gang 
involvement, imprisonment or murders; (3) request an accomplice-testimony jury 
instruction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-7(2) (2003), (4) request any element or 
definitional jury instruction on the group criminal activity statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-
3-203.1 (Supp. 2005); (5) object to the chaining and shackling of Mr. Alfatlawi in front of 
the jury before a final verdict was rendered; and, (6) object to Mr. Alfatlawi's double 
punishment for the single act of carrying a dangerous weapon. 
Standard of Review: 
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, ,l!a defendant must 
show (1) that counsel's performance was so deficient as to fall below an 
objective standard of reasonableness and (2) that but for counsel's deficient 
performance there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial 
would have been different.'" 
Myers v. State, 2004 UT 31,1f 20, 94 P.3d 211, quoting Wickham v. Galetka, 2002 UT 
72, Tl 19, 61 P.3d 978 (additional citation omitted). 
"An ineffective assistance of counsel claim is usually a mixed question of law and 
fact." State v. Johnson, 823 P.2d 484, 487 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), citing State v. Templin, 
805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990), citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 698 
(1984). 
Preservation: These issues are appropriately raised for the first time on appeal 
when the defendant is represented by counsel other than trial counsel, and the trial record 
is adequate to permit a decision on the issue. State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 814 n.l (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994), citing State v. Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah 1991). 
Issue 2: Whether the trial court erred by denying Mr. Alfatlawi's motion to 
exclude juror ten for cause without first exploring the potential bias of juror ten. 
Standard of Review: If a juror is not removed by counsel following a rejected 
for-cause challenge, the court's rejection must be reviewed pursuant to the plain error 
doctrine or exceptional circumstances. State v. King, 2006 UT 3,^18, — P.3d ~. A trial 
court's failure to investigate potential juror bias may constitute plain error. See id. at ^ 
19, quoting State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ^ 32, 12 P.3d 92. 
2 
Preservation: Defense counsel challenged juror ten for cause at a point in the 
selection process after the juror had revealed that an adult child worked in law 
enforcement. (R. 340 at 73-74 - SEALED.) 
Issue 3: Whether the trial court erred when it failed to provide a jury instruction 
on accomplice testimony pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-7(2) (2003). 
Standard of Review: An error not preserved below will not be reviewed absent a 
showing of plain error, ineffective assistance, or exceptional circumstances. E.g. State v. 
McCloud, 2005 UT App 466,1f 5, 126 P.3d 775, citing State v. Weaver, 2005 UT 49, \ 
18, 122 P.3d 566. Plain error requires a showing of both "obviousness and harmfulness," 
which are related. State v.Eldredge, 111* P.2d 29, 35 & n.8 (Utah 1989). 
Preservation: There was no objection to the trial court's failure to instruct the 
jury as to the unreliability of accomplice testimony. 
Issue 4: Whether the trial court erred when it failed to provide an element or 
definitional jury instruction on the group criminal activity statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-
3-203.1 (Supp. 2005). 
Standard of Review: "'Failure to give an elements instruction for a crime 
satisfies the manifest injustice standard under [Utah R. Cr. P.] 19(c) and constitutes 
reversible error as a matter of law.'" State v. Leleae, 1999 UT App 368, ^ 49 n.10, 993 
3 
P.2d 232, quoting State v. Stringham, 957 P.2d 602, 608 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), quoting 
State v Gibson, 908 P.2d 352, 354 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (alteration in original) (manifest 
injustice requirement of Utah R. Cr. P. 19(c), re-codified as Rule 19(e) (2005)). An error 
not preserved below will not be reviewed absent a showing of plain error, ineffective 
assistance, or exceptional circumstances. E.g., McCloud, 2005 UT App 466, % 5. 
Preservation: There was no objection to the trial court's failure to give an 
elements instruction on the offense of group criminal activity. 
Issue 5: Whether the trial court erred when it ordered Mr. Alfatlawi chained and 
shackled in front of the jury before a final verdict was rendered absent any evidence of a 
current threat to security or any attempt to identify a less prejudicial means of ensuring 
whatever security threat that might reasonably have existed. 
Standard of Review: An error not objected to below will not be reviewed absent 
a showing of plain error, ineffective assistance, or exceptional circumstances. E.g., 
McCloud, 2005 UT App 466, f^ 5. Plain error requires a showing of both "obviousness 
and harmfulness," which are related. Eldredge, 173 P.2d at 35 & n.8. 
Issue 6: Whether the trial court erred when it twice punished Mr. Alfatlawi for the 
single act of carrying a dangerous weapon. 
Standard of Review: A constitutional error may be asserted for the first time 
upon a showing of exceptional circumstances, see State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 
925-26 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), or if the error results in an illegal sentence, Utah R. Crim. 
P. 22(e). When considering an as-applied challenge to an Article I constitutional 
provision, the reviewing court applies heightened scrutiny and accords no deference to the 
4 
legislature. Wood v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 2002 UT 134, ^ 43, 67 P.3d 436 (Durham, 
CJ., dissenting, for a majority of the Court), citing In re Criminal Investigation, 7th Dist. 
Ct., ISA P.2d 633, 640 (Utah 1988) (addressing the rights of accused persons). The 
review court conducts an individualized inquiry into whether the statute at issue infringes 
upon the claimant's rights protected by Article I. Wood, 2002 UT 134, f^ 50 (addressing 
article I, section 11, but eschewing different standards depending upon the perceived 
fundamentally of the article I right at issue). 
Preservation: There was no objection to Mr. Alfatlawi being twice punished for 
the same criminal act. However, an illegal sentence may be corrected at any time. Utah 
R. Crim. P. 22(e). 
Issue 7: Whether the trial court erred when it sentenced Mr. Alfatlawi to prison 
for seventy years to life based upon bias and information not set forth in the presentence 
investigation report. 
Standard of Review: A sentencing decision is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion. State v. Montoya, 929 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), quoting State v. 
Houk, 906 P.2d 907, 909 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). An abuse of discretion is shown where a 
sentence is "inherently unfair," or is "clearly excessive." Montoya, 929 P.2d at 358, 
quoting Houk, 906 P.2d at 909, quoting State v. Wright, 893 P.2d 1113, 1120 (Utah App. 
1995). Alternatively, an error not objected to below will not be reviewed absent a 
showing of plain error, ineffective assistance, or exceptional circumstances. E.g., 
McCloud, 2005 UT App 466, lj 5, citing Weaver, 2005 UT 49, \ 18. 
5 
Preservation: At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Alfatlawi and defense counsel 
argued for no additional prison time or, in the alternative, for concurrent sentences. (R. 
344 at 4.) Moreover, an illegal sentence may be corrected at any time. Utah R. Crim. P. 
22(e). 
Issue VIII: Whether the cumulative effect of the errors herein undermine 
confidence that Mr. Alfatlawi received a fair trial. 
Standard of Review: When the defendant asserts both ineffective assistance of 
counsel and plain error claims on appeal, the reviewing court employs a "common 
standard of review," requiring a showing of a substantial likelihood of a more favorable 
outcome. State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), citing State v. Verde, 
770P.2d 116, 124 &n.l5 (Utah 1989). 
Preservation: As noted with regard to each individual issue, supra. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
U.S. Const, amend. V is attached as Addendum A. 
U.S. Const, amend. VIII is attached as Addendum B. 
Utah Const, art. I, § 9 is attached as Addendum C. 
Utah Const, art I, § 12 is attached as Addendum D. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-7(2) (2003) is attached as Addendum E. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (Supp. 2005) is attached as Addendum F. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (1995) is attached as Addendum G. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.8 (Supp. 2005) is attached as Addendum H. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (1994) is attached as Addendum I. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Preliminary Note: Sealed Transcripts. Following Mr. Alfatlawi's trial, the 
court ordered two volumes of the transcripts sealed: Volume I (R. 340), in which the jury 
was selected; and Volume IV (R. 343), in which the initial verdict was rendered and the 
jurors were polled. The trial court subsequently modified the order to allow those 
volumes to be unsealed for the purposes of appeal, provided that (a) only those persons 
directly involved in the prosecution of the appeal would have access to the transcripts, 
and (b) no information identifying any juror, potential juror or family member, including 
gender, would be made public. Reference to any portion of the record ordered sealed is 
noted herein. 
The Proceedings Below. This is an appeal from a final judgment of the Third 
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah, the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, 
presiding. Mr. Alfatlawi and two co-defendants were charged with eight counts of 
aggravated robbery, first degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 
(2003), and one count of aggravated burglary, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-203 (2003). (R. at 35-39.) The burglary charge arose from allegations 
that the three men entered a woman's house in the course of one of the robberies. (Id.) 
At the preliminary hearing, the court found insufficient evidence to bind Mr. Alfatlawi 
over on one count of aggravated robbery. (Compare R. 35-39 (2nd Amended 
Information including Count VI and hand-written note, "No Bound Over [sic]") with R. 
84 (Arraignment Notice, not including Count VI).) The co-defendants negotiated plea 
bargains, and only Mr. Alfatlawi proceeded to trial. 
7 
On April 29, 2005, following a two-day jury trial, Mr. Alfatlawi was found not 
guilty on one count of robbery, and was convicted on the remaining seven counts. (R. 
292, SEALED.) On July 15, 2005, the trial court imposed a sentence of from five years 
to life on each of the seven first-degree felonies; and it enhanced each sentence by four 
years pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 76-3-203.l(3)(e) (Supp. 2005); it lengthened each 
sentence by another year pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 2005). 
It ordered the sentences to run consecutively. (R. 296-98; the Sentence, Judgment, 
Commitment, is attached hereto as Addendum J.) Mr. Alfatlawi is serving a prison term 
of from seventy (70) years to life. (Mr. Alfatlawi is twenty-two years old (R. 9).) The 
Notice of Appeal was filed on August 9, 2005. (R. 314.) 
Mr. Alfatlawi's appellate counsel filed a motion seeking remand to the trial court 
to take evidence and render findings as to allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel 
pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 23(B). The state opposed the motion. The motion was 
denied. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Each aggravated robbery involved a perpetrator jumping out of a car, pointing a 
gun at the victim, and demanding that the victim produce cash and valuables. The 
aggravated burglary involved the entry into a house during one of the robberies. (See R. 
342 at 285-95 (the accomplice describes each incident).) Each section below presents the 
facts relevant to each issue on appeal. 
A. Jury Selection. During jury selection, the court asked each prospective juror 
to provide certain personal information such as where s/he worked and where spouses 
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and children worked. (R. 340 at 30-31 - SEALED.) Prospective juror ten responded that 
one child worked for "Utah patrols." (R. 340 at 32 - SEALED.) No follow-up voir dire 
occurred regarding this statement. 
Later, the court asked whether any potential jurors had been victims of a crime. 
(R. 340 at 43 - SEALED.) Prospective juror ten said his/her spouse was mugged 
randomly in a parking lot. (Id.) The spouse was hit in the head with a tire iron and six 
dollars was stolen; the thief was never apprehended. (Id.) Juror ten said the incident was 
traumatic, but said during follow-up voir dire that it would not affect an ability to follow 
the court's directions or ability to be fair. (R. 340 at 43-45 - SEALED.) 
Defense counsel subsequently challenged juror ten for cause based upon the 
spouse's mugging. Counsel did not mention the child's law enforcement job. (R. 340 at 
73-74 - SEALED.) The court rejected the challenge without mentioning or investigating 
the child's law enforcement job. (R. 340, at 74 - SEALED.) 
Finally, the court asked whether any potential jurors, their family members or 
friends were employed in law enforcement. Juror ten did not mention the child working 
for "Utah patrols." No follow-up voir dire occurred. (R. 340 at 76-79 - SEALED.) 
After the verdicts were returned and the jury dismissed, the trial court requested 
that the attorneys either return the court any records with juror identification information 
or safeguard any such record (R. 343 at 437-38). Defense counsel subsequently mailed 
the court a diagram he prepared during jury selection. (R. 292 - SEALED.) A copy of 
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counsel's diagram is attached hereto as Addendum K.1 With regard to juror ten, defense 
counsel notes the person's occupation and the spouse's mugging. The diagram mentions 
nothing about the child's law enforcement job. (Id.) 
Defense counsel then exercised his four peremptory challenges on potential jurors 
five, eight, fourteen and twenty-five. According to defense counsel's notes, juror twenty-
five was a victim of a house burglary, juror eight had two jobs unrelated to law 
enforcement, juror fourteen was a former police officer, and juror five had a job unrelated 
to law enforcement and a spouse who did not work outside the home. (R. 292 -
SEALED.) Juror ten was empanelled. (See id. (juror ten, listed as no. 6 on the court's 
Jury List, was the second juror empanelled).) 
B. The Tear-Drop Tattoo. Also during jury selection, the court asked jurors 
whether their ability to perform their duty might be affected by the prominent tattoo on 
Mr. Alfatlawi's forehead that reads "Iraqi Pride." (The trial occurred during a time of 
significant American casualties in Iraq.) Several responded that the tattoo might affect 
their impartiality. (R. 340 at 62-65 - SEALED.) 
One juror volunteered in open court that while the Iraqi Pride tattoo would not 
affect impartiality, the teardrop tattoo under one eye would. (R. 340 at 64 - SEALED.) 
In chambers, this juror recounted the commonly held notion that such tattoos relate to 
gang involvement, prior imprisonment, and/or murders previously committed: one drop 
1
 Everything in Addendum K pertaining to potential jurors, except for juror ten and the 
four counsel excused peremptorily, is redacted. All identifying information regarding 
those five jurors has been redacted. The original diagram is enclosed in a sealed envelop 
numbered 292 in the record on appeal. 
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for each killing. (R. 340 at 67-70.) This juror was ultimately struck for cause. (R. 340 at 
72-73.) 
While the court asked about the Iraqi Pride tattoo, it did not ask about the teardrop 
tattoo - even after the one juror voiced concerns in open court. Mr. Alfatlawi's trial 
counsel did not request any further voir dire on the subject. Mr. Alfatlawi's trial counsel 
did not request any sort of cautionary instruction. 
C. Accomplice Jury Instruction. Mr. Alfatlawi was convicted on three counts 
(IV, VI and VII) arising from two incidents in which the victims were unable to identify 
him. (R. 341 at 189 [Counts VI and VII], 213 [Count IV].) The only direct evidence of 
his involvement in those incidents was the testimony of James Butcher, an accomplice. 
(R. 342 at 287-88 (Counts VI and VII), 289 (Count IV).) As noted above, Mr. Alfatlawi 
was not convicted on two of the original charges of aggravated robbery for which there 
also was no eyewitness identification. {E.g., R. 341 at 162-63.) 
Mr. Butcher's testimony was not certain. Considerable prompting from the 
prosecutor was required before Mr. Butcher could remember anything specific. (E.g., R. 
342 at 285.) When asked to recount the robberies that occurred on one day, he answered: 
I don't remember exactly what I did. I remember doing some robberies, I 
don't know exactly which ones we did, but I remember doing some 
robberies. I can't tell you exactly which ones we did that day. 
(R. 342 at 285.) 
Counsel did not request an instruction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-7(2) 
(2003) on the unreliability of accomplice testimony, and the court did not offer one. (See 
R. 157-73.) 
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D. Group Criminal Activity. Counsel did not request, and the court did not 
offer, a jury instruction that defined each element of the group criminal activity statute, 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (Supp. 2005). Instead, at the bottom of each Special 
Verdict form, the following choice appeared: "We the jury do/do not find from all the 
evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt that in committing the offense of Aggravated 
Robbery, the defendant, Azharn Al Fatlawi acted in concert with two or more persons." 
(R. 292 - SEALED (special verdict forms).) A representative special verdict form, with 
the foreperson's signature redacted, is attached as Addendum L. 
E. Chaining and Shackling before the Jury. Mr. Alfatlawi's feet and hands 
were chained and shackled when the jury returned to render its verdict, and while the jury 
was being polled. (R. 343 at 422, 437 -- SEALED.) The jury was able to see the chains 
and shackles. (R. 343 at 437 - SEALED.) The court ordered Mr. Alfatlawi shackled 
because it had "heard earlier on in this case there [were] some threats of retaliation 
against witnesses." (Id.) Nothing in the record suggests that Mr. Alfatlawi then 
constituted a security threat. (See id.) Defense counsel did not object to his client being 
chained and shackled before the jury. (See id.) No different, less prejudicial means of 
addressing any legitimate security concerns were considered. (See id.) 
F. Double Punishment for the Same Criminal Act. Mr. Alfatlawi was 
convicted of six counts of aggravated robbery in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
302(1) (2003), and one count of aggravated burglary in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-
6-203 (2003). For each count the jury expressly found that Mr. Alfatlawi used a 
"dangerous weapon." (R. 292 - SEALED (special verdict forms, Counts I-IV, VI-VII, 
12 
VIII).) The sentence for each of the foregoing seven convictions was enhanced by one 
year, for a total of seven additional years, based upon Mr. Alfatlawi's use of a "dangerous 
weapon," pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 2005). (R. 344 at 7.) 
G. Sentence Based upon Bias and Anger. At the July 15,2005 sentencing 
hearing, defense counsel argued for no prison time or, in the alternative, the sentences to 
run concurrently. (R. 344 at 4: "We would ask if the Court does send him to prison, or 
give him an additional sentence to prison, that it would be concurrent.") Mr. Alfatlawi 
requested that the sentences run concurrently. (Id.: "I just hope that you run them 
concurrent, your Honor. Thank you.") The Transcript of Sentencing Proceedings (R. 
344) is attached as Addendum J. 
Later at the hearing, the court observed, "Mr. Alfatlawi, the only issue is whether 
these are consecutive or concurrent." (R. 344 at 7-9.) Mr. Alfatlawi soon responded, 
"Your Honor, I didn't do this crime." (R. 344 at 9.) This exchange, including the court's 
response, Mr. Alfatlawi's oral threats, and the court's angry reaction are as follows: 
THE COURT: Mr. Alfatlawi, the only issue is whether these are 
consecutive or concurrent. When I look at this I am really quite surprised. 
You and your family were apparently given political asylum from Iraq, 
allowed to come to this country to escape what many people in Iraq, before 
this current situation over there occurred, some rather brutal treatment by a 
rather brutal dictator. I assume the reason you were given political asylum is 
you were not on his list of most favorite people. Had this country not done 
that, you would probably be in one of those mass graves over there. But 
what we did in this country, we gave you political asylum, we allowed you to 
come here, along with your family, and enjoy the benefits of living in this 
country. And what thanks has this country got for it? We got someone who 
commits crimes, goes to prison, has been -
THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, I didn't do this crime. 
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THE COURT: Just a minute. You keep your mouth shut. I have 
given you your chance to be heard. I don't want to hear anymore. Now is 
my turn to talk. 
You come over here, take advantage of that, you have been involved 
in the criminal justice system since you were very young. I know a lot about 
this case because we tried it. I know the trauma the victims went through. 
THE DEFENDANT: I don't even care. You can just run it 
consecutive. I don't give a fuck. I don't. I don't give a fuck. Fuck you, you 
mother fuckers. We riders. We don't give a fuck. We die for this shit, 
where I am from, from Iraq, you mother fucker. We die, you mother fucker. 
We riders, you mother fucker. We die for this shit, punk. I will fuck you up 
and your fucking family, you bitch, you fucking punk, you mother fucker. 
THE COURT: Take him out. 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, take me out, bitch. I'll fuck you up and 
your family and your daughter, bitch. Remember that. 
THE COURT: If that's the kind of people we got over in Iraq, maybe 
we ought to get out. I suspect that's not the case. I suspect there are good 
people, just like everywhere else in the world. Mr. Alfatlawi is not one of 
them. He is a criminal of the worst kind. He preys on people that are 
minding their own business. He robbed a store here where a lady was trying 
to make a new store work, in the middle of the night. They took advantage 
of a widow in the Cove area, who went out and to try and give assistance, 
and they terrorized her. A man coming home, unloading his baggage in his 
home, they robbed. A young woman walking down the street, who was out 
of gas, in the night, coming home from work, they attempted to rob her. She 
didn't have anything, so they couldn't take it. Random acts of violence, for 
example, on Mr. Dean. This is just outside the pizza store on 13th there. 
They pull up and point a gun at him and demand his money. He only has 
five dollars, but he gives it to them. And on and on and on. 
This is the kind of guy that ought to be off the street for a long period 
of time, as long as I can make it. Considering his attitude, if the Board of 
Pardons lets him out in other than a box, they are nuts, because he will do 
this again. It is too bad we can't deport him back to Iraq. If I had any say-so 
about it, that's exactly where he would go, and he can deal with the situation 
over there. He would last about 20 minutes, with his attitude. 
But, in any event, Mr. Alfatlawi has earned and he gets from me a 
consecutive sentence on each one of these. They all run consecutively. By 
my count it is 70 years to life. I realize the statute may not allow that, but the 
Board of Pardons, if they want to reduce it to 30 to life, it is their business, 
but not me. This guy deserves to be in prison for a long, long time. 
Commitment forthwith. You can give him the good news, Mr. Simms. 
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[Brief discussion about recalculating restitution.] 
THE COURT: $1,700. That's what I said. Tell Mr. Alfatlawi to have 
a nice life. 
(this proceeding was concluded) 
(R. 344 at 9-12-SEALED.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Mr. Alfatlawi raises six discrete issues under the rubric of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, five of which are also discussed as errors committed by the trial court. Another 
issue is raised only as ineffective assistance, while another challenges the 
constitutionality of a statute as applied to Mr. Alfatlawi. In an attempt to simplify their 
presentation, the issues asserted as both ineffective assistance and error by the court are 
discussed in Points I through V. The issue that constitutes ineffective assistance of 
counsel is discussed in Point VI. The trial court's imposition of a seventy-year-to-life 
sentence is discussed in Point VII. Point VIII addresses cumulative error. 
Where counsel failed to probe a juror's potential bias, once challenged the juror 
for cause but did not renew the challenge based upon the juror's failure to accurately 
respond to a voir dire question, and then did not exercise a peremptory challenge, the 
attorney provided ineffective assistance. The court's failure to investigate the juror's 
potential bias before rejecting the for-cause challenge constitutes plain error. (Point I.) 
Where an accomplice provided the only direct evidence leading to three first-
degree convictions, and the accomplice's testimony was uncertain and required frequent 
prompting from the prosecution, counsel provided ineffective assistance by not 
requesting a cautionary instruction regarding the unreliability of accomplice testimony 
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pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-7(2) (2003). For the same reasons, the court 
committed plain error for not itself offering the instruction. (Point II.) 
Where settled precedent mandates a definitional or element jury instruction that 
requires the jury to find each element of the group criminal activity statute beyond a 
reasonable doubt, counsel provided ineffective assistance by not requesting such an 
instruction. For the same reason, the court committed plain error in not offering such an 
instruction. (Point III.) 
Where the court ordered Mr. Alfatlawi chained and shackled in front of the jury at 
a critical stage of the criminal process based upon a hearsay comment reportedly 
overheard at a pretrial hearing, without any evidence that Mr. Alfatlawi presented a risk 
at that time, and without any consideration of less prejudicial means to address any such 
threat, Mr. Alfatlawi's right to a presumption of innocence was infringed. Counsel 
provided ineffective assistance by not objecting, and the court committed plain error by 
ordering, the chains and shackles under these circumstances. (Point IV.) 
Mr. Alfatlawi was twice punished for a single criminal act. This violates the U.S. 
Constitution, amend. V, because the legislature has not clearly indicated its intent to 
impose cumulative punishment. This also violates the Utah Constitution, art. I, § 12, 
because Utah's constitution provides more protection against double jeopardy than does 
its federal counterpart, and because the essence of the protection is to prevent multiple 
punishments for the same criminal act. Counsel provided ineffective assistance by not 
objecting to the double punishment. Exceptional circumstances permit this court to 
review the constitutionality of the enhancement statute. (Point V.) 
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Counsel provided ineffective assistance by doing nothing to lessen the certain 
prejudice flowing from Mr. Alfatlawi's teardrop tattoo. Such tattoos are widely known to 
connote prior imprisonment, the commission of murders, and/or gang affiliation. Even 
after a potential juror announced in open court that the tattoo would prevent the juror 
from being impartial, counsel did not request a cautionary instruction or seek further voir 
dire, (Point VI.) 
The court committed plain error when, in response to Mr. Alfatlawi's verbal 
threats, the court itself made inappropriate comments about, for example, Mr. Alfatlawi's 
nation of origin and his parents' status as political refugees. In its anger, it showed bias 
and considered inappropriate facts. The court even acknowledged, as it handed down the 
seventy-year minimum sentence, that the sentence might be illegal. (Point VII.) 
The foregoing errors, considered cumulatively, undermine confidence in the result 
of Mr. Alfatlawi's trial, as well as in the sentence. (Point VIII.) 
ARGUMENT 
As noted above, Points I through V raise issues addressed both as ineffective 
assistance and plain error. 
With regard to defense counsel's ineffective representation, the federal and Utah 
Constitutions guarantee defendants effective assistance of counsel. U.S. Const, amends. 
VI and XIV; Utah Const. Art. I, § 12; see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
A defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel "must show (1) that counsel's 
performance was so deficient as to fall below an objective standard of reasonableness and 
(2) that but for counsel's deficient performance there is a reasonable probability that the 
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outcome of the trial would have been different." State v. Montoya, 2004 UT 5, \ 23, 84 
P.3d 1183, quoting Wickham v. Galetka, 2002 UT 72, «[ 19, 61 P.3d 978. 
Absent evidence to the contrary, there exists a "strong presumption that under the 
circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy." State v. 
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, If 19, 12 P.3d 92 (internal quotes omitted), citing Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 689, quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955). The essence of 
defense counsel's function "is to make the adversarial testing process work in the 
particular case." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. A criminal defendant is constitutionally 
guaranteed effective counsel to "justify reliance on the outcome of the proceeding." Id. 
While strategic decisions made upon adequate investigation are "virtually 
unchallengeable," Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, a choice based upon less than a thorough 
investigation are reasonable only to the extent that circumstances at the time support such 
a choice. Id. at 691-92. A failure to investigate the basic facts of a case is never 
considered a legitimate tactical decision: 
If counsel does not adequately investigate the underlying facts of a case ... 
counsel's performance cannot fall within the "wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance." This is because a decision not to investigate cannot 
be considered a tactical decision. 
Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 188 (Utah 1990) (footnote omitted), quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 686. 
In sum, despite the presumption of regularity accorded counsel's informed 
decisions, this court must still scrutinize the facts of this case to ensure justice is done: 
In every case the court should be concerned with whether, despite the strong 
presumption of reliability, the result of the particular proceeding is 
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unreliable because of a breakdown in the adversarial process that our system 
counts on to produce just results. 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696. 
With regard to plain error committed by the trial court, where trial counsel did not 
preserve an objection, Mr. Alfatlawi must establish (1) the trial court committed an error, 
(2) the error was pain, and (3) the error affected Mr. Alfatlawi's substantial rights, i.e., 
that it was harmful. E.g., Eldredge, 113 P.2d at 35. Plain error requires a showing of 
both ^'obviousness and harmfulness," which are related. The greater the harm, the less 
critical becomes the obviousness requirement. Id. at 35, n.8. 
POINT I: COUNSEL AND THE COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO 
EXPLORE POTENTIAL JUROR BIAS. 
A. Counsel Provided Ineffective Assistance. 
Points I through V will first address counsel's ineffective assistance in terms of (1) 
deficient representation, and (2) the prejudice caused by deficient representation. Each 
Point then will discuss the court's plain error or, as in Point V (double punishment for a 
single act), exceptional circumstances, which permit appellate review. 
1. Deficient Representation. Counsel provided deficient representation when he 
failed to note important information about a juror, and when, based upon inadequate 
investigation, he failed to renew the challenge after the juror's failure to respond 
accurately to a voir dire question, or exclude the juror with a peremptory challenge. 
It is imperative to explore any specific concern raised about a juror's potential bias. 
State v. Woolley, 810 P.2d 440, 443 (Utah Ct. App.), cert denied 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 
1991). 
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When comments are made which facially question a prospective juror's 
impartiality or prejudice, an abuse of discretion may occur unless the 
challenged juror is removed by the court or unless the court or counsel 
investigates and finds the inference rebutted. 
Woolley, 180 P.2d at 444 n.6, quoting State v. Cobb, 114 P.2d 1123, 1126 (Utah 1989). 
A failure to exercise a peremptory challenge is presumed to be for strategic 
purposes absent evidence of trial counsel's inattentiveness or evidence that any claim of 
strategic purpose is implausible. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, at ^ 25. To rebut the 
presumption with allegations of inattentiveness, a defendant must provide "a specific and 
clear example of inattentiveness that directly caused the failure to object to a particular 
juror...." Id. at ^ 25 n.10. Counsel's failure to investigate an inference of bias may 
constitute an abuse of discretion. Woolley, 810 P.2d at 444 n.6, quoting Cobb, 11A P.2d 
at 1126. 
A juror sharing an occupation with someone who testifies at trial is potentially 
prejudicial enough that not allowing voir dire into the issue is an abuse of discretion. 
Depew v. Sullivan, 2003 UT App 152, ^ 17, 71 P.3d 601. A similarity in employment at 
least raises a "question" or "inference" of bias. See Woolley, 810 P.2d at 444. "All that is 
necessary for a voir dire question to be appropriate is that it allow c[a party] to exercise 
his peremptory challenges more intelligently.'" Depew, 2003 UT App 152, \ 12, quoting 
State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 845 (Utah 1988), quoting State v. Ball, 685 P.2d 1055, 
1060 (Utah 1984). 
At the beginning of the selection process, juror ten said an adult child worked for 
law enforcement. (R. 340 at 32 - SEALED.) The juror then disclosed that the juror's 
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spouse was the victim of an armed robbery, carried out by surprise, fear and violence. 
(R. 340 at 43-45 - SEALED.) These factors are also prominent in the case on review. 
The perpetrator was never apprehended. (Id.) Defense counsel's own notes indicate that 
he was aware of the spouse's violent mugging, but was inattentive to the child's law 
enforcement job. (R. 292 - SEALED.) Counsel challenged juror ten for cause based 
upon the similarity of the spouse's mugging and the allegations against Mr. Alfatlawi, but 
not upon the child's law enforcement job, is further evidence of inattentiveness. (R. 340 
at 73-74 - SEALED.) The court denied the challenge without either mentioning the 
child's employment or questioning the juror about it. Id. Still later in the selection 
process, the court expressly asked if any juror or close family members were employed 
by law enforcement. Juror ten did not respond. (R. 340 at 76-79 - SEALED.) Neither 
the court nor counsel followed up on this omission; counsel did not renew the cause 
challenge. Counsel did not exercise a peremptory challenge to juror ten, who then was 
seated as a juror. (R. 292 - SEALED.) 
Inexplicable is counsel's failure to either renew the cause challenge based upon the 
juror's failure to respond to a voir dire question, or exercise a peremptory challenge to 
juror ten, whom he previously challenged for cause. None of the venire subsequently 
dismissed with his peremptory challenges had also been challenged for cause. 
Most importantly, no presumption of a strategic purpose for failing to exercise a 
peremptory challenge attaches when the decision is based upon an inadequate 
investigation. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, j^ 25 n.10. Trial counsel investigated neither the 
juror's child's law enforcement job, nor the juror's failure to respond when the court 
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asked about law enforcement connections. Counsel certainly was "inattentive" to the 
juror's comment about the child's employment, as evidenced both by his failure to record 
this information on his diagram, and by his failure to mention this information when he 
challenged the juror for cause. Only inattentiveness can explain counsel's failure to 
investigate the juror's failure to accurately respond to a voir dire question. Counsel's 
failures to note, investigate, or act upon these signs of potential bias rebut any 
presumption of strategic purpose. The failures constitute deficient performance. 
2. Deficient Representation Caused Prejudice. Defense counsel's failure to 
explore juror bias creates a presumption of bias. 
With regard to exploring specific concerns about a potentially biased juror, a 
failure to do so may deny the defendant his constitutional right to an impartial jury. 
Woolley, 810 P.2d at 442. A failure to investigate any inference of bias may constitute an 
abuse of discretion. Id. at 444 n.6, quoting Cobb, 114 P.2d at 1126. A decision is never 
presumed to further a strategic purpose when it is made before adequate investigation 
occurs. Templin, 805 P.2d at 188, quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. 
In this case, juror ten raised enough concerns that counsel challenged the juror for 
cause - without considering, mentioning or investigating the juror's connections to law 
enforcement, or the juror's subsequent failure to describe the connection when 
specifically asked. Counsel surrendered his client's right to an impartial jury. Prejudice 
may be presumed, and counsel undermined confidence in the outcome. 
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B. The Court Abused its Discretion By Rejecting the For-Cause Challenge 
Without First Exploring the Potential Bias of Juror Ten. 
The trial court committed plain error when it denied Mr. Alfatlawi's cause 
challenge to juror ten without exploring the juror's potential bias. 
A court may deny a motion to strike potential jurors for cause who have 
connections to law enforcement may be upheld - but only following some investigation 
into potential bias. State v. Gray, 851 P.2d 1217 (Utah Ct. App.), cert denied 860 P.2d 
943 (Utah 1993); State v. Ramos, 882 P.2d 149, 152-53 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), citing State 
v. Cobb, 114 P.2d 1123 (Utah 1989); State v. Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22, 25-26 (Utah 1984). 
Where counsel has failed to preserve an objection to the court's rejection of a 
cause challenge by striking the juror with a peremptory challenge, the court's action is 
subject to challenge pursuant to the plain error doctrine. King, 2006 UT 3, ^ | 18. 
Nonetheless, a trial court must still investigate potential juror bias in its role of assuring 
the defendant a fair and impartial jury, and its failure to do so may constitute plain error. 
See id. atlflj 16, 19. 
As detailed herein, the trial court's failure to investigate potential juror bias before 
and after rejecting the cause challenge distinguishes this case from State v. Menzies, 889 
P.2d 393 (Utah 1994). The court erred in so doing and the error is plain. 
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Juror ten's admission to being traumatized by the random and violent mugging of 
the juror's spouse, by itself, raises questions about the trial court's rejection of the cause 
challenge. The similarity between the mugging and the charges against Mr. Alfatlawi 
make it even more so. This, combined with the court's rejection of the cause challenge 
without investigating the juror's connections with law enforcement, and without 
investigating the juror's subsequent failure to respond accurately to a voir dire question, 
constitutes obvious error. Especially when considered with counsel's blatant 
inattentiveness during the jury selection process, Mr. Alfatlawi was prejudiced by being 
deprived of a fair and impartial jury. -See also infra, Point VIII (cumulative error). 
POINT II: COUNSEL AND THE COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO 
REQUEST OR PROVIDE AN INSTRUCTION CAUTIONING 
THE JURY ABOUT THE UNRELIABILITY OF 
ACCOMPLICE TESTIMONY. 
A. Counsel Provided Ineffective Assistance. 
1. Deficient Representation. Defense counsel provided deficient representation 
when he failed to request an instruction cautioning the jury about relying upon the 
uncorroborated testimony of Mr. Butcher. 
A trial court may, pursuant to its discretion, caution a jury that the uncorroborated 
testimony of an accomplice should be considered with caution. Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-
7(2) (2003). Where the accomplice's testimony is uncertain, however, the statute 
mandates such an instruction. Id. 
Direct evidence is that which proves a fact without resort to inference. 
Circumstantial evidence may be relevant to a fact, but the fact-finder must infer 
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something from the evidence before reaching that fact. Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 
F.3d 913, 930 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 522 U.S. 914 (1997), quoting 22 Wright & Graham, 
Jr., Federal Practice and Procedure § 5214 at 265 (1978). 
In this case, the only direct evidence of Mr. Alfatlawi's involvement in three 
counts arising from two incidents was the testimony of Mr. Butcher, an accomplice. (R. 
342 at 287-88 (Counts VI and VII), 289 (Count IV).) 
Mr. Butcher's testimony was anything but certain. Considerable prompting from 
the prosecutor was required before Mr. Butcher could remember anything specific. For 
example, when asked to recount the robberies that occurred on one day, he responded: 
I don't remember exactly what I did. I remember doing some robberies, I 
don't know exactly which ones we did, but I remember doing some 
robberies. I can't tell you exactly which ones we did that day. 
(R. 342 at 285; see also id. at 285-89 (has to be prompted to recall specific robberies), 
290 (cannot recall where he went following the robberies, cannot identify a car used 
during the robberies), 289, 292-93 (remembers Mr. Alfatlawi remaining in the car during 
one robbery; contrast R. 341 at 197-98 (victim testifies Mr. Alfatlawi got out of the car)), 
R. 342 at 296 (either unsure or evasive about his decision to participate in robberies), 297 
(must be reminded about prior statements in this case), 302 (cannot remember how tall 
Mr. Alfatlawi is), 302-03 (cannot recall where they left a car).) 
No plausible, strategic reason conceivably exists for not requesting the accomplice 
cautionary instruction - which request would occur outside the jury's presence. 
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2. Deficient Representation Caused Prejudice. 
Counsel's failure to request a cautionary instruction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
77-17-7 (2003) undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial. 
By its enactment of Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-7, the legislature acknowledged the 
dubious credibility of uncorroborated accomplice testimony. Why would the legislature 
even address the issue if it were not one of real concern? 
In this case, two of the original charges of aggravated robbery did not result in 
convictions: one was dismissed following the preliminary hearing; the other resulted in a 
not-guilty verdict. Common to both of these charges were the victims' inability to 
identify Mr. Alfatlawi. (E.g., R. 341 at 162-63.) Mr. Alfatlawi was found guilty of three 
counts (IV, VI and VII), arising from two incidents, in which the victims were also 
unable to identify him. (R. 341 at 189 [Counts VI and VII], 213 [Count IV].) 
The accomplice's vague and uncertain testimony was key to tying Mr. Alfatlawi to 
these three crimes. The jury should have been cautioned as to its inherent unreliability. 
Counsel's failure undermines confidence in the outcome, especially as to Counts IV, VI 
and VIII. 
B. The Court Committed Plain Error By Not Warning the Jury about the 
Unreliability of Accomplice Testimony. 
The trial court committed plain error when it failed to caution the jury as to the 
unreliability of accomplice testimony pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-7(2) (2003). 
The court erred by not giving the instruction. As detailed immediately above, the 
accomplice could recall little about the incidents at issue without considerable prompting 
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from the prosecuting attorney. With regard to two incidents in particular, which gave rise 
to three convictions, the accomplice provided the only direct evidence of Mr. Alfatlawi's 
involvement. The error was obvious because, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-7(2), 
the court did not have discretion whether to give the instruction. The accomplice's 
uncertainty required that the instruction be given. 
The error caused harm. The evidence as to the three convictions for which the 
accomplice provided the only direct evidence was close, as demonstrated by the other 
similar counts that did not result in convictions. 
POINT III: COUNSEL AND THE COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO 
REQUEST OR PROVIDE AN ELEMENT OR DEFINITION 
INSTRUCTION ON GROUP CRIMINAL ACTIVITY 
A. Counsel Provided Ineffective Assistance. 
1. Deficient Representation. Utah's group criminal activity statute, Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (Supp. 2005), requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
accomplices intended to commit an illegal act. State v. Lopes, 1999 UT 24, Tj 11, 980 
P.2d 191. In effect, the statute creates a separate offense. Id., TJ 8. Jury instructions must 
clearly identify and define the material provisions of an offense upon which a jury's 
decision may turn. See State v. Jones, 823 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah 1991); State v. Laine, 
618 P.2d 33, 35 (Utah 1980). 
The version of § 76-3-203.1 at issue when Lopes was decided in 1999 expressly 
defined "in concert with two or more persons" as requiring proof that the accomplices "be 
liable for the offense as [was the defendant]...." (Addendum G.) The statute has since 
been amended to define "in concert" as requiring proof that the accomplices aided or 
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encouraged the defendant, and were either physically present or participated as parties to 
violate one of several statutes listed subsection (4) of the statute: 
(b) "In concert with two or more persons" as used in this section means the 
defendant was aided or encouraged by at least two other persons in 
committing the offense and was aware that he was so aided or encouraged, 
and each of the other persons: 
(i) was physically present, or 
(ii) participated as a party to any offense listed in Subsection (4). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1(1 )(b) (Supp. 2005)2 
"In concert," then, at least requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that two or 
more people aided or encouraged Mr. Alfatlawi to commit a criminal offense, and were 
parties or were present. The second co-defendant did not testify and thus did not provide 
evidence regarding aid or encouragement. Yet the jury instructions did not define "in 
concert." The special verdict forms (see R. 292 - SEALED) did not require proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt of each element of "in concert." The special verdict forms merely 
required the jury to "find from all the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt that in 
committing the offense [ ] the defendant, [Mr. Alfatlawi] acted in concert with two or 
more persons." (R. 292 - SEALED). 
2
 In turn, the criminal code requires, at the least, an intent to act in a criminal manner or 
encourage such action before incurring liability as a party accomplice: 
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of an 
offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, 
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which 
constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (2003). 
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No strategic purpose lies in allowing the jury to find group criminal activity, thus 
lengthening Mr. Alfatlawi's imprisonment by a mandatory four years for each of seven 
convictions, upon proof of fewer elements than the statute requires. 
2. Deficient Representation Caused Prejudice. Where counsel's failure to 
request an adequate jury instruction allows a defendant be punished on less than proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt of every element of an offense, the outcome of the trial is 
affected and prejudice is presumed. 
The failure to properly instruct the jury on all elements of the group criminal 
activity statute constitutes manifest injustice requiring reversal as a matter of law. 
Leleae, 1999 UT App 368, j^ 49 & n.10. Also, evidence susceptible to establishing 
prejudice is that Mr. Alfatlawi's minimum sentence was lengthened by twenty-eight 
years based upon the inadequately defined charge. 
B. The Court Committed Plain Error When It Failed to Provide a Definition or 
Element Instruction on Group Criminal Activity. 
The trial court committed plain error when it failed to provide the jury with an 
instruction that set forth and defined each element of the group criminal activity statute. 
By failing to properly instruct the jury, the courted erred in the face of clear 
precedent. Lopes, 1999 UT 24, \ \\\Leleae, 1999 UT App 268, \ 49, n.10. 
The error caused harm. A failure to define and require proof of each element of 
the group criminal activity statute constitutes manifest injustice requiring reversal as a 
matter of law. Leleae, 1999 UT App 268, ^ 49 & n.10. 
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POINT IV: COUNSEL AND THE COURT ERRED WHEN EACH 
PERMITTED OR CAUSED THE DEFENDANT TO APPEAR 
BEFORE THE JURY IN CHAINS AND SHACKLES AT A 
CRITICAL STAGE OF THE CRIMINAL PROCESS. 
A. Counsel Provided Ineffective Assistance. 
1. Deficient Representation. Baffling is defense counsel's passive acquiescence 
to the chaining and shackling of his client in front of the jury before a final verdict was 
rendered. 
Every defendant is entitled to a fair and impartial trial. Kennedy v. Car dwell, 487 
F.2d 101, 104 (6th Cir. 1973), citing Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105, 108 (1954). This 
entitlement follows from "the principle that there is a presumption of innocence in favor 
of the accused." Kennedy, at 104, quoting Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 
(1895). 
A presumption of innocence goes hand-in-hand with the appearance of innocence. 
As the Colorado Supreme Court declared: 
The presumption of innocence requires the garb of innocence, and 
regardless of the ultimate outcome, or of the evidence awaiting presentation, 
every defendant is entitled to be brought before the court with the 
appearance, dignity, and self-respect of a free and innocent man.... 
Kennedy, at 104, quoting Eaddy v. People, 174 P.2d 717, 718-19 (Colo. 1946). 
The majority view is in accord with the statement that "it is prejudicial for a 
defendant on trial to be shackled in a courtroom." Kennedy, 487 F.2d at 107 & n.9, 
quoting Woodards v. Car dwell, 430 F.2d 978, 982 (6th Cir. 1970). Shackling before a 
jury may be necessary to alleviate a threat to security, but only when the threat is real, and 
only where no less prejudicial means will suffice. Kennedy, at 110-111. 
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Utah has embraced the principle that a defendant is entitled not only to the 
presumption of innocence, but the appearance of innocence as well. While a "brief and 
fortuitous" encounter between a juror and a shackled defendant might not constitute 
prejudice per se, State v. Wetzel, 868 P.2d 64, 70 (Utah 1993), quoting Allen v. 
Montgomery, 728 F.2d 1409, 1414 (11th Cir. 1984), allowing a defendant to appear 
before a jury at a critical stage of the proceeding in prison garb constitutes plain error. 
Chess v. Smith, 617 P.2d 341, 344-45 (Utah 1980). 
Mr. Alfatlawi appeared with chains and shackles at a critical stage of the 
proceeding. The Utah constitution requires a unanimous jury verdict to support a 
criminal conviction. Utah Const, art. I, § 10. "A criminal defendant's right to poll the 
jury is a corollary to the defendant's right to a unanimous verdict." State v. Heaps, 2000 
UT 5, U 13, 999 P.2d 565, citing 21A Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law § 1293 (1998). In short, 
there is no unanimous verdict, and thus no verdict or conviction at all, until each juror is 
polled. See Heaps, at f 13. A jury's return to the courtroom to announce a verdict and, 
upon request, being polled, therefore, constitute a critical stages of the criminal 
proceeding. 
Mr. Alfatlawi's hands and feet were left chained and shackled at the defense table 
when the jury returned to announce its verdict, and then while each juror was polled. (R. 
343 at 422, 426-33, 437 - SEALED.) He was left shackled based upon comments by 
others regarding threats allegedly overheard during a pretrial hearing. (Id. at 437.) The 
chains and shackles were visible to the jury. (Id.) The decision to have Mr. Alfatlawi 
chained and shackled was made before the jury entered the courtroom. (Id.) There is 
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nothing in the record to suggest Mr. Alfatlawi presented an actual threat to security. The 
record lacks even a hint that Mr. Alfatlawi's demeanor at that critical stage was any 
different than during other stages of the trial. No evidence exists that defense counsel 
objected to the chains and shackles, that he questioned the need for them, or that he 
sought any less visible and prejudicial means to maintain security. Counsel did nothing to 
protect his client's rights to a presumption of innocence or a unanimous jury verdict. 
Because the decision to keep Mr. Alfatlawi in chains and shackles was made 
before the jury reentered the courtroom, and thus could have been challenged outside the 
jury's presence, no plausible strategic purpose explains counsel's surrender of Mr. 
Alfatlawi's presumption of innocence or a unanimous jury verdict. 
2. Deficient Representation Caused Prejudice. By his failure to ensure the 
presumption of innocence to which Mr. Alfatlawi is entitled, confidence in the outcome 
of the trial was undermined. 
Maintenance of the presumption of innocence - and the corollary appearance of 
innocence - at every critical stage of the criminal process, is so fundamental that, in Utah, 
a threat thereto may constitute plain error and presumed prejudice. See Chess, 617 P.2d 
at 344-45, quoting Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 504-05 (1976). Even where 
evidence of guilt may be overwhelming, reversal is still warranted when the defendant's 
right to a presumption of innocence is infringed. State v. Bennett, 2000 UT 34, ^ 10, 999 
P.2d 1 (Zimmerman, J., concurring). 
While Chess and Bennett pertain to prison clothes, the same presumption of 
prejudice should also apply to cases involving shackles and chains where, as here, (1) the 
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order to keep the defendant in shackles and chains upon the jury's return was based upon 
a statement overheard some weeks or months ago, (2) the record is completely void of 
evidence that the defendant presented a security risk, and (3) there was no consideration 
of less prejudicial means by which any security threat actually presented could have been 
addressed before resorting to shackles and chains. Clothes that merely suggest a 
defendant may be incarcerated at the time of trial cannot possibly have a more negative 
impact upon jurors than seeing a fellow human chained and shackled like an animal. 
B. The Trial Court Committed Plain Error by Chaining and Shackling the 
Defendant before the Jury without Sufficient Cause 
The trial court committed plain error by leaving Mr. Alfatlawi in chains and 
shackles upon the jury's return, at a critical stage of the criminal process, without having 
sufficient justification. 
The court erred by compromising Mr. Alfatlawi's appearance of innocence, and 
thus the presumption of innocence, at a critical stage of the criminal process based merely 
upon an uncorroborated report stemming from a pretrial hearing without any objective 
sign of a current security threat, and without considering other less prejudicial means of 
addressing any such threat short of shackles and chains. Kennedy, 487 F.2d at 104-106; 
Eaddy, 174 P.2d at 718-19. 
The error was plain. Kennedy, 487 F.2d at 104-106, 107; Eaddy, 174 P.2d at 718-
19. There simply exists no legitimate argument in support of chaining and shackling a 
defendant prior to the rendering of the jury's final verdict absent sufficient cause. 
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The error caused harm. As noted immediately above, chaining and shackling a 
defendant like an animal, absent actual cause to support such extreme measures, is every 
bit as shocking, dehumanizing, and violative of the constitutional guarantee to a 
presumption of innocence as appearing in prison clothes, and thus causes prejudice. 
POINT V: COUNSEL AND THE COURT ERRED BY ALLOWING OR 
ORDERING DOUBLE PUNISHMENT FOR A SINGLE 
CRIMINAL ACT. 
A. Counsel Provided Ineffective Assistance. 
1. Deficient Representation. On each count of aggravated robbery and 
aggravated burglary for which Mr. Alfatlawi was sentenced to prison, he received an 
additional year of imprisonment for using a dangerous weapon pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-203.8 (Supp. 2005) Defense counsel provided deficient representation by 
not objecting to the constitutionality of the dangerous weapons enhancement statute. The 
applicability of both federal and state protections are discussed below. 
a. Fifth Amendment. The Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy clause 
does not prohibit the legislature from enhancing punishment for an act that also 
constitutes an element of the underlying offense - if and only i/the legislature's intent to 
impose cumulative punishment is clearly indicated. Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 
366 (1983). In Hunter, the Court addressed a case very similar to this. There, the 
underlying robbery statute became a first degree felony upon proof of use of a "dangerous 
and deadly weapon." Id. at 361-62. A separate statute enhanced the punishment for all 
felonies by three years, again, upon proof of use of a "dangerous and deadly weapon." Id. 
The Court upheld the imposition of cumulative punishments because, "[W]here the 
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offenses are the same ... cumulative sentences are not permitted, unless elsewhere 
specially authorized by Congress"" Id. at 367, quoting Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 
684, 693 (1980) (emphasis, ellipses and brackets in Hunter). 
Here, legislative intent to impose cumulative punishment for the same criminal act 
is anything but clear. Prior to 1995, the enhancement statute applicable to first degree 
felonies (then codified at § 76-3-201(1); Addendum I) required enhancement upon use of 
a "firearm." Double jeopardy challenges to the pre-1995 "firearm" enhancement were 
rejected because, the Utah appellate courts observed, the legislature is authorized to 
specify certain dangerous weapons, i.e., firearms, that pose a greater threat to public 
safety than other dangerous weapons and thus warrant a longer sentence. State v. Speer, 
750 P.2d 186, 192 (Utah 1988); State v. Angus, 581 P.2d 992, 995 (Utah 1978); State v. 
Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 85-87 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). In each case, it was the difference 
between the underlying offense and the enhancement statute that saved the latter. 
The current version of the enhancement statute no longer refers to "firearm," it 
refers to "dangerous weapon." There is no longer a difference between the dangerous 
weapons enhancement statute and the aggravated burglary and robbery statutes. The 
legislature is presumed to be aware of prior case law. E.g., Theurer v. Board of Review, 
Indus. Com'n of Utah, Dept. of Employment Sec, 725 P.2d 1338, 1343 (Utah 1986). The 
legislature, therefore, is presumed to have known it was eliminating the enhancement 
statute's claim to survival when it removed mention of "firearm" in favor of "dangerous 
weapon." 
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The Utah Supreme Court sua sponte acknowledged this post-1995 ambiguity of 
legislative intent in a case where cumulative punishment from an enhancement statute 
was not at issue and was not briefed. State v. Montiel, 2005 UT 48, ^ 2 n.2, 122 P.3d 571 
(noting, without deciding, the issue of whether aggravated robbery may still be enhanced 
by the post-1995 "dangerous weapons" statute). 
Legislative intent is not clear. Absent clear intent, cumulative punishment violates 
the federal double jeopardy clause.3 
b. Utah Const art I, § 12. The Utah Constitution declares a person may 
not be punished twice for the same offense. Utah Const, art. I, § 12 (Addendum D). The 
Utah Supreme Court has declared that the double jeopardy clause of article I, section 12 
provides broader protection than its federal counterpart: Although Utah's prohibition is 
similar on its face to the federal prohibition, "the double jeopardy guarantees afforded 
defendants under the Utah Constitution are different from and provide greater protection 
than those afforded by the United States Constitution...." State v. Harris, 2004 UT 103, ^ 
23, 104 P.2d 1250. 
Further evidence of this more expansive application of Utah's double jeopardy 
prohibition is demonstrated by the appellate courts' express consideration of whether 
cumulative punishment under the pre-1995 firearms enhancement statute violated double 
3
 Moreover, absent clear intent to impose cumulative punishment, imposing cumulative 
punishment for the same act violates the federal and state cruel and unusual punishment 
prohibitions against excessive punishment. See State v. Morrison, 2001 UT 73, ^  28, 31 
P.3d 547 (Eighth Amendment prohibits excessive punishment); State v. Bishop, 111 P.2d 
261, 267 (Utah 1986) (Utah Const, art I, § 9 tracks the Eighth Amendment, but for the 
addition of the "unnecessary rigor" clause, which supports broader application of § 9). 
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jeopardy. See, e.g., Speer, 750 P.2d at 192; Angus, 581 P.2d at 995; Webb, 790 P.2d at 
85-87. In each of those cases, the court considered whether the pre-1995 firearms 
enhancement of felonies, which, in turn, required proof of use of a dangerous weapon, 
violated the prohibition against "double punishment for the same criminal act" Webb, 
790 P.2d at 85 (emphasis added), citing Angus, 581 P.2d at 995. The mere difference 
between the pre-1995 statutes, as noted above, was enough to signal clear legislative 
intent and meet Fifth Amendment requirements. See State v. Guillaume, 1999 MT 29, \ 
13, 975 P.2d 312. Yet the Utah courts considered additional factors, such as legislative 
authority and public policy, before rejecting the double jeopardy challenges. E.g., Angus, 
581 P.2d at 994-95. See also Hunter, 459 U.S. at 366-67, quoting Albernaz v. United 
States, 450 U.S. 333, 339 (1981), quoting Biockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 
304 (1932) (a tool of statutory construction permits cessation of double jeopardy analysis 
upon showing that each of the two offenses at issue require proof of a different fact than 
the other).4'5 
4
 None of the state court opinions specifically reference either article I, section 12 or the 
Fifth Amendment as the basis for their double jeopardy analysis. However, given that the 
analysis of each goes beyond that required by the U.S. Supreme Court pursuant to the 
Fifth Amendment, it must be presumed that each relied upon section 12; the only other 
explanation would be that each opinion engaged in superfluous inquiry. 
5
 Separate analysis under state constitutional grounds is especially appropriate where, as 
here, arms are involved. Utah's constitutional protection of the right to bear arms, art I, § 
6, is far more expansive than its federal counterpart, amend. II. The former expressly 
references "security and defense of self, family, others, property, or the state," while the 
latter expressly references only "a well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security 
of a free State." This alone 'enhances' the significance of any Utah constitutional 
provision that overlaps the citizenry's use of arms. 
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The Court's opinion in Guillaume, 1999 MT 29, 975 P.2d 312 (attached as 
Addendum N), provides a detailed analysis of double jeopardy jurisprudence and the 
Hunter Court's interpretation of the Fifth Amendment - before rejecting Hunter in favor 
of a common sense interpretation of the state's double jeopardy provision to prohibit 
double punishment for the same act. There, the defendant was convicted of felony 
assault, which is elevated from a misdemeanor by proof of use of a "weapon." 
Guillaume, 1999 MT 29, fflf 9, 18. His sentence then was enhanced pursuant to the state's 
weapons enhancement statute, by proof of use of a "dangerous weapon." Id. at ^ 9. The 
Montana Constitution declares, "No person shall be again put in jeopardy for the same 
offense previously tried in any jurisdiction." Id. at |^ 8, citing Mont. Const, art. II, § 25. 
Montana courts had previously applied section 25 to prohibit "multiple punishments 
imposed at a single prosecution for the same offense." Guillaume, 1999 MT 29, J^ 8 (and 
cases cited therein; emphasis added). After signaling its refusal to "march lockstep with 
the United States Supreme Court" in interpreting double jeopardy protections, id. at ^j 
14-16,6 the Montana Court held that "application of the weapon enhancement statute to 
felony convictions where the underlying offense requires proof of use of a weapon 
violates the double jeopardy provision of [the state constitution]." Id. at 16. The Court 
distilled to its essence the right against double jeopardy: "In so holding, we are guided by 
the fundamental principle embodied in double jeopardy. Simply put, double jeopardy 
6
 Compare Durham, Employing the Utah Constitution in the Utah Courts, Utah Bar 
Journal, pp. 25-26 (vol. 2, no. 9, Nov. 1989) (discussing Montana as an example of a 
state that, at least in 1983, adhered to the "lockstep" approach, refusing to interpret its 
constitution any more broadly than its federal constitutional counterparts). 
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exemplifies the legal and moral concept that no person should suffer twice for a single 
act." Guillaume, 1999 MT 29, H 17. 
The Court emphasized that its prohibition of cumulative punishment was necessary 
to give meaning to double jeopardy protection: 
Moreover, it makes sense that "double jeopardy applies to multiple 
punishments because, if it did not, then the prohibition against multiple 
prosecutions would be meaningless; a court could simply achieve the same 
effect as a second prosecution by resentencing a criminal defendant after the 
defendant had served all or part of an initial sentence." 
Guillaume, 1999 MT 29, U 19, quoting Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. 163, 175 (1873). 
Rejecting the state's argument that double jeopardy protects only against multiple 
convictions for the same offense, whereas the enhancement statute merely lengthens a 
defendant's sentence based upon criteria well within the legislature's sphere of authority, 
Guillaume, 1999 MT 29, ffl[ 20-22, the Montana Court again relied on common sense and 
purpose: 
The argument that application of the weapon enhancement statute to a 
felony assault conviction results in only one punishment for use of a 
weapon, rather than two, is one of pure semantics. Were we to accept this 
argument, we would in effect strip double jeopardy of all meaning. We 
refuse to merely pay lip service to the fundamental principle of double 
jeopardy. 
Guillaume, 1999 MT 29, ^ 22. 
In Utah, the use or threatened use of a "dangerous weapon" elevates second-degree 
burglary to first-degree aggravated burglary. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203(l)(b), (2) 
(2003). Second-degree robbery is likewise elevated to first-degree aggravated robbery 
upon the use of threatened use of a "dangerous weapon." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
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302(l)(a), (2) (2003). Utah's "dangerous weapon" enhancement statute provides for 
punishments ranging from a mandatory one-year increase in sentence, to a five-year 
increase in the maximum term imposed, to an indeterminate, independent sentence of 
from five to ten years, depending upon circumstances. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.8(2), 
(4) (Supp. 2005). In Utah, a "deadly weapon" may include anything from "a pocket 
knife, a baseball bat, or even a pencil, in some circumstances." Angus, 581 P.2d at 995; 
see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(5) (2003) (defining dangerous weapon based, in 
large part, upon the object's use or apparent intended use). 
In Utah, the rationale for rejecting challenges to the pre-1995 "firearms" 
enhancement no longer holds. No more may the legislature be seen as merely declaring 
as public policy that, for example, a person who robs someone with a gun deserves a 
longer sentence than one who robs someone with a pencil. See Angus, 581 P.2d at 994-
95. Absent this legitimate distinction, a person may now be punished twice for the very 
same act, even if it involves the use or threatened use of a pencil. The Guillaume opinion 
provides clear guidance to how article I, section 12 may now be interpreted. Pursuant to a 
common-sense interpretation of section 12 forbidding multiple punishments for the same 
act, Mr. Alfatlawi's consecutive one-year dangerous weapon enhancements should be 
vacated for every felony count that depended upon proof of his use of a dangerous 
weapon. 
2. Prejudice. After 1995, based both upon the Supreme Court's decision in 
Hunter, and the Utah's courts' decisions in Angus and its progeny, legislative intent to 
impose cumulative punishment for the same criminal act was unclear. Thus counsel 
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should have objected. His failure to object resulted in the addition of one year to each of 
the seven sentences run consecutively; i.e., a mandatory additional seven years in prison. 
B. Exceptional Circumstances Exist to Review the Court's Violation of Double 
Jeopardy Protections; in the alternative, This Court May Review Defendant's 
Illegal Sentence Pursuant to Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e). 
Where as here, a change in law raises questions about the validity of a statute that 
was used to impose a seven-year prison sentence, and counsel below did not preserve the 
issue for the record, utilization of the exceptional circumstances exception to the 
preservation rule is appropriate. 
We have said that the extraordinary circumstances doctrine applies to "rare 
procedural anomalies." [State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1209 n. 3 (Utah 
1993)]. Recently, we have applied the exception sparingly, reserving it for 
the most unusual circumstances where our failure to consider an issue that 
was not properly preserved for appeal would have resulted in manifest 
injustice. The court of appeals has aptly characterized the concept as a 
"safety device" against such injustice. State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 8 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1996) (citing State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 923 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991)). 
State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, ^ 23, 94 P.3d 186. 
Such procedural anomalies may include a change in the way the constitution is 
interpreted in certain circumstances. E.g., State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1134 (Utah 
1994) (defendant had no reason to argue certain search and seizure claims in the trial 
court, therefore the lack of preservation of such claims is understandable). In this case, it 
may have been reasonably assumed that the enhancement statute's applicability to the 
aggravated robbery and burglary was still settled law. Since Mr. Alfatlawi was 
convicted, however, the Utah Supreme Court has gone out of its way to notify 
practitioners of the potential issue created by the 1995 amendment of the enhancement 
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statute. Montiel, 2005 UT 48, ^ f 2 n.2 (the opinion in Montiel was issued in August, 
2005; Mr. Alfatlawi was convicted and sentenced in April and July, 2005, respectively). 
Moreover, declining review of the imposition of a potentially unconstitutional 
mandatory seven-year prison sentence based upon trial counsel's inattentiveness would 
constitute a manifest injustice. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, ^ 23. Application of the 
w
"safety devise' against such injustice" is precisely the role exceptional circumstances 
review is supposed to accomplish. Id, quoting Irwin, 924 P.2d at 8. 
Finally, because this constitutes a challenge to the sentence itself, as it was based 
upon an unconstitutional application of an enhancement statute thus imposing an 
additional seven years on the sentence, the sentence is illegal and may be challenged at 
any time pursuant to Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e). See State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, 994 
P.2d 1243; State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856 (Utah 1995). 
The legal argument as to (a) statutory ambiguity and the Fifth Amendment, and (b) 
application of article I, section XII in the manner suggested by Guillaume, 1999 MT 29, 
are incorporated herein by express reference, rather than repeating each. 
POINT VI: COUNSEL PROVIDED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE BY 
NOT ADDRESSING JUROR BIAS CREATED BY THE 
DEFENDANT'S TEARDROP TATTOO. 
A* Counsel Provided Deficient Representation. 
Defense counsel provided deficient representation when he failed to address the 
unavoidable bias and prejudice flowing from Mr. Alfatlawi's teardrop tattoo. 
Evidence is inadmissible as unfairly prejudicial "if it has a tendency to influence 
the outcome of the trial by improper means, or if it appeals to the jury's sympathies, or 
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arouses its sense of horror, provokes its instinct to punish or otherwise causes a jury to 
base its decision on something other than the established propositions of the case." Terry 
v. Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314, 323 n.31 (Utah 1979) {overruledon other 
grounds, McFarlandv. Skaggs Cos., 678 P.2d 298 (Utah 1984)), citing Lease America 
Corp. v. Insurance Company of North America, 88 Wis.2d 395, 276 N.W.2d 767, 770 
(1979). 
It is difficult to imagine anything more likely to inspire unfair prejudice than the 
label of ex-con, gang banger, and/or murderer. Individually or in combination, these are 
precisely what a teardrop tattoo connotes. See, e.g., Henderson v. Cockrell, 333 F.3d 592, 
595 (5th Cir. 2003) ("When asked about the meaning of a teardrop tattoo under a person's 
eye, [the witness] testified that she had always known it to mean that the person had killed 
someone."); United States ex rel. demons v. Walls, 202 F. Supp. 2d 767, 777 n.17 (N.D. 
111. 2002) ("Several witnesses testified that teardrop tattoos are quite common; indeed, 
they are 'widespread among gang members.'"); People v. Bright, 2002 WL 66154, *9 
(Cal. App. 5 Dist.) (attached as Addendum O) ("In addition, defendant's tattoos on his 
face and neck, and the teardrop tattoo below his eye, were likely to clue the jury that 
defendant had been in prison."); People v. Walker, 2002 WL 475265, * 1 (Cal. App. 4 
Dist.) (attached as Addendum P) ("On September 5, the court interviewed Juror No. 4 
again.... Someone explained that a teardrop tattoo, like [the co-defendant] displayed, 
meant that he was a gang member who had committed murder."); Wynn v. State, 804 
So.2d 1122, 1142 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000) (during a side bar, "the trial court and the 
attorneys for the State and the defense discussed the admissibility of evidence that 
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teardrop tattoos are gang-related symbols."), cert, denied Wynn v. Alabama, 535 U.S. 972 
(2002); Ovalle v. State, 13 S.W.3d 774, 790 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (recording from 
state's closing argument, "At 15, he's committing aggravated assault with a deadly 
weapon, and you can see by the teardrop tattoo on his face that he's proud of it. He's now 
a gang banger, a street punk, Vato Locos."); People v. Davenport, 702 N.E.2d 335, 341 
(111. App. Ct. 1998)("Officer Bloore also identified a teardrop tattoo frequently used by 
gang members on demons' face."); Palomo v. State, 925 S.W.2d 329, 337 (Tex. App. 
1996) ("After overruling appellant's objections, [the witness] testified that, in the Po' 
Boyz gang, a teardrop tattoo symbolizes either that one has murdered someone, or that 
one has served time in jail."); Avalos v. State, 850 S.W.2d 781, 782-83 (Tex. App. 1993) 
("Appellant's motion for new trial alleged that after retiring for deliberations, two jury 
members commented to other jurors that a teardrop tattoo below appellant's left eye 
indicated appellant had been to prison.... The jury foreman ... a drug and alcohol abuse 
counselor, testified that during the trial he noticed appellant's teardrop tattoo and 
commented that from his experience the tattoo indicated the person had been in prison.").7 
At trial in this case, one member of the jury venire voiced concern about Mr. 
Alfatlawi's teardrop tattoo in response to the court's question about Mr. Alfatlawi's other 
prominent tattoo - in open court before all other potential jurors. (R. 340 at 64 -
SEALED.) In chambers, the juror recited the commonly held notion that such tattoos 
relate to gang involvement, incarceration, and/or murders previously committed: one tear 
7
 While not necessarily an objective gauge of notoriety, a computer Web search for the 
term teardrop tattoo yields thousands of references to gangs, prisons and murders. 
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drop for each killing. (R. 340 at 67-70 - SEALED.) Voir dire as to other issues 
continued after this conference. Although this juror was ultimately struck for cause, the 
above-cited authority makes clear that jurors likely are already aware of the tattoo's 
connotations, and they are quite willing to discuss them among themselves. 
Despite all this, defense counsel neither sought voir dire regarding teardrop tattoo 
nor requested some sort of cautionary instruction from the court aimed at lessening the 
prejudice. This failure, when viewed in context with counsel's several other failures to 
speak on his client's behalf, culminating in his effective abandonment of his role in the 
adversarial process, defeat any presumption that remaining silent, hoping the problem 
might just go away, represented some strategic choice on counsel's part. 
B. Deficient Representation Caused Prejudice. 
Counsel's failure to address the juror bias caused by a tattoo that signifies either 
prior imprisonment, the commission of murders, and/or gang involvement undermines 
confidence in the outcome of Mr. Alfatlawi's trial. 
The cases cited immediately above, coupled with commonsense (not to mention a 
Google search), remove legitimate doubt that at least some jurors must have known a 
teardrop tattoo means something very bad - and wholly irrelevant to the charges against 
Mr. Alfatlawi. The rules of evidence exist precisely to keep out such inflammatory and 
prejudicial information. E.g., Utah R. Evid. 403 (prejudice), 404(a)(1) (character of the 
accused), 406 (routine practice), 609 (prior crimes). 
Nor does legitimate doubt exist as to jurors' propensity to share such information 
among themselves. E.g., Walker, 2002 WL 475265, * 1 (attached as Addendum P) ("On 
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September 5, the court interviewed Juror No. 4 again.... Someone explained that a 
teardrop tattoo, like [the co-defendant] displayed, meant that he was a gang member who 
had committed murder."); Avalos, 850 S.W.2d at 782-83 ("two jury members commented 
to other jurors that a teardrop tattoo below appellant's left eye indicated appellant had 
been to prison...). 
Defense counsel's failure to address the obvious and substantial bias created by 
the tattoo prejudiced Mr. Alfatlawi, and calls into question the legitimacy of the outcome. 
POINT VII: THE COURT ERRED BY IMPOSING CONSECUTIVE 
SENTENCES BASED UPON BIAS AND INFORMATION 
NOT PART OF THE RECORD. 
The trial court exhibited bias against Mr. Alfatlawi at the sentencing hearing 
during the final exchange between the court and Mr. Alfatlawi, and by its comments 
following Mr. Alfatlawi's removal from the courtroom. 
Without conceding that plain error analysis applies (as opposed correcting an error 
of law under Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e)), this section is organized pursuant to the three 
o 
requisites for plain error. 
The court erred when it imposed consecutive sentences based upon bias and anger. 
A court "necessarily makes a personal determination whenever it imposes sentence. 
State v. Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9, ^ 14, 84 P.3d 854, quoting State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 
66 If 66, 52 P.3d 1210, cert denied 537 U.S. 1172 (2003). Neither bias nor prejudice is 
8
 Because this constitutes a challenge to the sentence's legality and not to the underlying 
conviction, the sentence may be challenged at any time pursuant to Utah R. Crim. P. 
22(e). See Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, 994 P.2d 1243; Brooks, 908 P.2d 856 (Utah 1995). 
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shown when the court's attitude relates to the actual subject matter of the lawsuit. 
Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9, ^ 14, quoting In re Young, 1999 UT 81, 1j 35, 984 P.2d 997. 
However, the corollary must also be true: an attitude that does not relate to the 
lawsuit's subject matter may well signify bias and prejudice. Compare Thorkelson, 2004 
UT App 9, |^ 14. A defendant's sentence must always be calculated by an unbiased court: 
Not only is a litigant entitled to have his case tried by an impartial and 
unbiased judge, but when, as here, he is a defendant in a criminal case, he is 
entitled to have the severity of his sentence determined by a jurist who has 
no personal bias or prejudice toward him as a defendant. 
State v. Byington, 114 Utah 388, 200 P.2d 723, 726 (1948), overruled on other grounds, 
First Federal Sav. & Loan Ass yn v. Schamanek, 684 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1984). While the 
trial court is accorded wide discretion in deciding whether to impose consecutive 
sentences, such decisions must be based upon information properly in the record. See 
State v. Law, 2003 UT App 228, ffi|5-7, 7 5 p - 3 d 9 2 3-
In this case, Mr. Alfatlawi interrupted the court as it reached the decision of 
whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences to say, "Your honor, I didn't do 
this crime." To which the court responded, "Just a minute. You keep your mouth shut." 
(R. 344 at 9.) Mr. Alfatlawi then threatened the judge, and that was just the start. 
The court improperly considered the fact that Mr. Alfatlawi's parents had arrived 
in the United States years before as political refugees from Iraq. (R. 344 at 9-10.) The 
court improperly opined about the character of other Iraqis. (Id. at 10.) The court 
speculated that Mr. Alfatlawi would last "about 20 minutes" were he deported to Iraq. 
(Id.) The court imposed a seventy-year-to-life sentence upon Mr. Alfatlawi - effectively 
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a life sentence for the twenty-two-year-old - even while conceding its doubts about the 
sentence's legality. {Id. at 11.) The court then spoke the finals words at the hearing: "[to 
defense counsel] Tell Mr. Alfatlawi to have a nice life/' {Id. at 12.) 
The trial court was clearly angry following Mr. Alfatlawi's oral threats. While 
such a reaction may be understandable, it is not proper. The trial court's decision to 
impose consecutive prison sentences totaling seventy years to life while still in such a 
state of mind constitutes error. 
The error is plain. A sentence must be based only upon information properly in 
the record before it, not upon anger and bias. See Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9, f^ 14; 
Byington, 200 P.2d at 726; Law, 2003 UT App 228, If 5. A judge must maintain decorum 
in proceedings, should remain patient and dignified during official proceedings, and must 
avoid even the appearance of bias or prejudice. Utah Code Jud. Conduct. Canon 3, B(3), 
(4), (5). See State v. Alonzo, 973 P.2d 975, 979 (Utah 1998) (Code of Judicial Conduct 
defines standard for judicial behavior). 
The error caused harm. As noted immediately above, Mr. Alfatlawi is entitled to 
be sentenced based upon information in the record, not upon bias and anger. The court 
had not yet announced whether it would impose concurrent or consecutive sentences, or 
some combination thereof. Only following the angry exchange, and the court's 
intemperate comments, did the court impose consecutive sentences totaling seventy years 
to life. Being sentenced by a court so angry that it did not care whether the sentence it 
imposed was legal violates Mr. Alfatlawi's fundamental statutory and due process rights 
to a fair trial. A sentence rendered under such conditions constitutes harm. 
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POINT VIII: CUMULATIVE ERROR REQUIRES REVERSAL. 
Where no single error significantly undermines confidence in a jury verdict, the 
combined effect of several errors may. Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp., 801 
P.2d 920, 928 (Utah 1989). Especially where the evidence is close, the cumulative effect 
of errors must be seriously considered. See State v. Ernrnett, 839 P.2d 781, 786 (Utah 
1992). 
The evidence was close in this case, especially regarding the three counts for 
which the accomplice provided the only direct evidence of Mr. Alfatlawi's involvement. 
One can hardly review the trial and sentence hearing transcripts without drawing an 
impression of an attorney intent on expending as little effort as possible on behalf of his 
client, and determined not to make waves in any event. The attorney abdicated his 
fundamental role of making the adversarial process work. When an effective life 
sentence hangs in the balance, a defendant in Utah deserves better. 
CONCLUSION 
If the court finds ineffective assistance of counsel, the convictions should be 
vacated and the case remanded for a new trial. A new trial is also required if this court 
finds the trial court erroneously failed to investigate juror bias, caution the jury regarding 
accomplice testimony, failed to adequately define or set forth the elements of group 
criminal activity, or preserve Mr. Alfatlawi's right to a presumption of innocence. If this 
court finds that the dangerous weapon statute is unconstitutional as applied, the illegal 
sentence should be vacated and the case remanded for new sentencing proceedings. If 
this court finds that consecutive sentences were imposed at a time when the trial court 
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was angry, or from anger and bias, the illegal sentence should be vacated and the case 
remanded for new sentencing proceedings. 
DATED this 2d day of March, 2006. 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
U.S. Const. Amend. V 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval 
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall 
any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor 
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation. 
ADDENDUM B 
U.S. Const. Amend. VIII 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishments inflicted. 
ADDENDUM C 
Utah Const. Art. 1, § 9 
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not be imposed; nor shall cruel 
and unusual punishments be inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated 
with unnecessary rigor. 
ADDENDUM D 
Utah Const. Art. 1, § 12 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person 
and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a 
copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, 
to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to 
have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the 
offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money 
or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give 
evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor 
a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same 
offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the function of 
that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise 
provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay 
evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination 
to determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the 
defendant if appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
ADDENDUM E 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-7 (2003) 
§ 77-17-7. Conviction on testimony of accomplice—Instruction to jury 
(1) A conviction may be had on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. 
(2) In the discretion of the court, an instruction to the jury may be given to the effect that 
such uncorroborated testimony should be viewed with caution, and such an instruction 
shall be given if the trial judge finds the testimony of the accomplice to be self 
contradictory, uncertain or improbable. 
Laws 1980, c. 15, §2. 
ADDENDUM F 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (Supp. 2005) 
§ 76-3-203.1. Offenses committed in concert with two or more persons— Notice-
Enhanced penalties 
(l)(a) A person who commits any offense listed in Subsection (4) is subject to an 
enhanced penalty for the offense as provided in Subsection (3) if the trier of fact finds 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the person acted in concert with two or more persons. 
(b) "In concert with two or more persons" as used in this section means the defendant was 
aided or encouraged by at least two other persons in committing the offense and was 
aware that he was so aided or encouraged, and each of the other persons: 
(i) was physically present; or 
(ii) participated as a party to any offense listed in Subsection (4). 
(c) For purposes of Subsection (l)(b)(ii): 
(i) other persons participating as parties need not have the intent to engage in the same 
offense or degree of offense as the defendant; and 
(ii) a minor is a party if the minor's actions would cause him to be a party if he were an 
adult. 
(2) The prosecuting attorney, or grand jury if an indictment is returned, shall cause to be 
subscribed upon the information or indictment notice that the defendant is subject to the 
enhanced penalties provided under this section. 
(3) The enhanced penalty for a: 
(a) class B misdemeanor is a class A misdemeanor; 
(b) class A misdemeanor is a third degree felony; 
(c) third degree felony is a second degree felony; 
(d) second degree felony is a first degree felony; and 
(e) first degree felony is an indeterminate prison term of not less than nine years and 
which may be for life. 
(4) Offenses referred to in Subsection (1) are: 
(a) any criminal violation of Title 58, Chapter 37, 37a, 37b, or 37c, regarding drug-
related offenses; 
(b) assault and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 1; 
(c) any criminal homicide offense under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 2; 
(d) kidnapping and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 3; 
(e) any felony sexual offense under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4; 
(f) sexual exploitation of a minor as defined in Section 76-5a-3; 
(g) any property destruction offense under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 1; 
(h) burglary, criminal trespass, and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 2; 
(i) robbery and aggravated robbery under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 3; 
(j) theft and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 4; 
(k) any fraud offense under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 5, except Sections 76- 6-504, 76-6-
505, 76-6-507, 76-6-508, 76-6-509, 76-6-510, 76- 6-511, 76-6-512, 76-6-513, 76-6-514, 
76-6-516, 76-6-517, 76- 6-518, and 76-6-520; 
(1) any offense of obstructing government operations under Title 76, Chapter 8, Part 3, 
except Sections 76-8-302, 76-8-303, 76-8-304, 76-8-307, 
76-8-308, and 76-8-312; 
(m) tampering with a witness or other violation of Section 76-8-508; 
(n) extortion or bribery to dismiss criminal proceeding as defined in Section 76-8-509; 
(o) any explosives offense under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 3; 
(p) any weapons offense under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 5; 
(q) pornographic and harmful materials and performances offenses under Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Part 12; 
(r) prostitution and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 13; 
(s) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 15, Bus Passenger Safety Act; 
(t) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 16, Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act; 
(u) communications fraud as defined in Section 76-10-1801; 
(v) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 19, Money Laundering and Currency 
Transaction Reporting Act; and 
(w) burglary of a research facility as defined in Section 76-10-2002. 
(5) It is not a bar to imposing the enhanced penalties under this section that the persons 
with whom the actor is alleged to have acted in concert are not identified, apprehended, 
charged, or convicted, or that any of those persons are charged with or convicted of a 
different or lesser offense. 
Laws 1990, c. 207, § 1; Laws 1994, c. 12, § 108; Laws 1999, c. 11, § 1, eff. May 3, 1999; 
Laws 2000, c. 214, § 2, eff. March 14, 2000; Laws 2001, c. 209, § 2, eff. April 30, 2001; 
Laws 2005, c. 93, § 9, eff. May 2, 2005. 
ADDENDUM G 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (1995) 
§76-3-203.1 Offenses committed by three or more persons — Enhanced penalties. 
(1) (a) A person who commits any offense listed in Subsection (4) in concert with two or 
more persons is subject to an enhanced penalty for the offense as provided below. 
(b) "In concert with two or more persons" as used in this section means the defendant and 
two or more other persons would be criminally liable for the offense as parties under 
Section 76-2-202. 
(2) (a) The prosecuting attorney, or grand jury if an indictment is returned, shall cause to 
be subscribed upon the complaint in misdemeanor cases or the information or indictment 
in felony cases notice that the defendant is subject to the enhanced penalties provided 
under this section. The notice shall be in a clause separate from and in addition to the 
substantive offense charged. 
(b) If the subscription is not included initially, the court may subsequently allow the 
prosecutor to amend the charging document to include the subscription if the court finds 
the charging documents, including any statement of probable cause, provide notice to the 
defendant of the allegation he committed the offense in concert with two or more 
persons, or if the court finds the defendant has not otherwise been substantially 
prejudiced by the omission. 
(3) The enhanced penalties for offenses committed under this section are: 
(a) If the offense is a class B misdemeanor, the convicted person shall serve a minimum 
term of 90 consecutive days in a jail or other secure correctional facility. 
(b) If the offense is a class A misdemeanor, the convicted person shall serve a minimum 
term of 180 consecutive days in a jail or other secure correctional facility. 
(c) If the offense is a third degree felony, the convicted person shall be sentenced to an 
enhanced minimum term of three years in prison. 
(d) If the offense is a second degree felony, the convicted person shall be sentenced to an 
enhanced minimum term of six years in prison. 
(e) If the offense is a first degree felony, the convicted person shall be sentenced to an 
enhanced minimum term of nine years in prison. 
(f) If the offense is a capital offense for which a life sentence is imposed, the convicted 
person shall be sentenced to a minimum term of 20 years in prison. 
(4) Offenses referred to in Subsection (1) are: 
(a) any criminal violation of Title 58, Chapter 37, 37a, 37b, or 37c, regarding drug-
related offenses; 
(b) assault and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 1; 
(c) any criminal homicide offense under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 2; 
(d) kidnapping and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 3; 
(e) any felony sexual offense under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4; 
(f) sexual exploitation of a minor as defined in Section 76-5a-3; 
(g) any property destruction offense under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 1; 
(h) burglary, criminal trespass, and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 2; 
(i) robbery and aggravated robbery under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 3; 
(j) theft and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 4; 
(k) any fraud offense under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 5, except Sections 76-6-503, 76-6-
504, 76-6-505, 76-6-507, 76-6-508, 76-6-509, 76-6-510, 76-6- 511, 76-6-512, 76-6-513, 
76-6-514, 76-6-516, 76-6-517, 76-6-518, and 76-6- 520; 
(1) any offense of obstructing government operations under Part 3, Title 76, Chapter 8, 
except Sections 76-8-302, 76-8-303, 76-8-304, 76-8-307, 76-8- 308, and 76-8-312; 
(m) tampering with a witness or other violation of Section 76-8-508; 
(n) extortion or bribery to dismiss criminal proceeding as defined in Section 76-8-509; 
(o) any explosives offense under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 3; 
(p) any weapons offense under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 5; 
(q) pornographic and harmful materials and performances offenses under Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Part 12; 
(r) prostitution and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 13; 
(s) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 15, Bus Passenger Safety Act; 
(t) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 16, Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act; 
(u) communications fraud as defined in Section 76-10-1801; 
(v) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 19, Money Laundering and Currency 
Transaction Reporting Act; and 
(w) burglary of a research facility as defined in Section 76-10-2002. 
(5) (a) This section does not create any separate offense but provides an enhanced penalty 
for the primary offense. 
(b) It is not a bar to imposing the enhanced penalties under this section that the persons 
with whom the actor is alleged to have acted in concert are not identified, apprehended, 
charged, or convicted, or that any of those persons are charged with or convicted of a 
different or lesser offense. 
(c) The sentencing judge rather than the jury shall decide whether to impose the enhanced 
penalty under this section. The imposition of the penalty is contingent upon a finding by 
the sentencing judge that this section is applicable. In conjunction with sentencing the 
court shall enter written findings of fact concerning the applicability of this section. 
(6) The court may suspend the imposition or execution of the sentence required under this 
section if the court: 
(a) finds that the interests of justice would be best served; and 
(b) states the specific circumstances justifying the disposition on the record and in 
writing. 
History: C. 1953, 76-3-203.1, enacted by L. 1990, ch. 207, § 1; 1994, ch. 12, § 108. 
ADDENDUM H 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.8 (Supp. 2005) 
§ 76-3-203.8. Increase of sentence if dangerous weapon used 
(1) As used in this section, "dangerous weapon" has the same definition as in Section 76-
1-601. 
(2) If the trier of fact finds beyond a reasonable doubt that a dangerous weapon was used 
in the commission or furtherance of a felony, the court: 
(a)(i) shall increase by one year the minimum term of the sentence applicable by law; and 
(ii) if the minimum term applicable by law is zero, shall set the minimum term as one 
year; and 
(b) may increase by five years the maximum sentence applicable by law in the 
case of a felony of the second or third degree. 
(3) A defendant who is a party to a felony offense shall be sentenced to the increases in 
punishment provided in Subsection (2) if the trier of fact finds beyond a reasonable doubt 
that: 
(a) a dangerous weapon was used in the commission or furtherance of the felony; and 
(b) the defendant knew that the dangerous weapon was present. 
(4) If the trier of fact finds beyond a reasonable doubt that a person has been sentenced to 
a term of imprisonment for a felony in which a dangerous weapon was used in the 
commission of or furtherance of the felony and that person is subsequently convicted of 
another felony in which a dangerous weapon was used in the commission of or 
furtherance of the felony, the court shall, in addition to any other sentence imposed 
including those in Subsection (2), impose an indeterminate prison term to be not less than 
five nor more than ten years to run consecutively and not concurrently. 
Laws 2003, c. 148, § 4, eff. May 5, 2003; Laws 2004, c. 276, § 2, eff. May 3, 2004. 
ADDENDUM I 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (1994) 
§ 76-3-203 Felony conviction — Indeterminate term of imprisonment — Increase of 
sentence if firearm used. 
A person who has been convicted of a felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for an 
indeterminate term as follows: 
(1) In the case of a felony of the first degree, for a term at not less than five years, unless 
otherwise specifically provided by law, and which may be for life but if the trier of fact 
finds a firearm or a facsimile or the representation of a firearm was used in the 
commission or furtherance of the felony, the court shall additionally sentence the person 
convicted for a term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and the court 
may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed 
five years to run consecutively and not concurrently; 
(2) In the case of a felony of the second degree, for a term at not less than one year nor 
more than 15 years but if the trier of fact finds a firearm or a facsimile or the 
representation of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of the felony, the 
court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a term of one year to run 
consecutively and not concurrently; and the court may additionally sentence the person 
convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not 
concurrently; 
(3) In the case of a felony of the third degree, for a term not to exceed five years but if the 
trier of fact finds a firearm or a facsimile or the representation of a firearm was used in 
the commission or furtherance of the felony, the court may additionally sentence the 
person convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively 
and not concurrently. 
(4) Any person who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment for a felony in which a 
firearm was used or involved in the accomplishment of the felony and is convicted of 
another felony when a firearm was used or involved in the accomplishment of the felony 
shall, in addition to any other sentence imposed, be sentenced for an indeterminate term 
to be not less than five nor more than ten years to run consecutively and not concurrently. 
History: C. 1953, 76-3-203, enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-203; 1976, ch. 9, § 1; 
1977, ch. 88, § 1; 1983, ch. 88, § 5. 
ADDENDUM J 
\W^e° 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AZHARN ALFATLAWI, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 041905314 FS 
Judge: TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
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ALFATLAWI,A2HARN 
-- *** / 
Case No: 041905314 
Date: Jul 15, 2005 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY a 1st 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than ten years and which may be life in the Utah State 
Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY a 1st 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than ten years and which may be life in the Utah State 
Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY a 1st 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than ten years and which may be life in the Utah State 
Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY a 1st 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than ten years and which may be life in the Utah State 
Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY a 1st 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than ten years and which may be life in the Utah State 
Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED BURGLARY a 1st 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than ten years and which may be life in the Utah State 
Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY a 1st 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than ten years and which may be life in the Utah State 
Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
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Case No: 041905314 
Date: Jul 15, 2005 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
These 7 sentences are to run consecutively and not concurrent 
Restitution ordered to: Mr. Kingston m 
Osman $1700, Mr. Clark $180, Mr. Yorgans 
State Farm Ins, $953.40, & Crime vict: 
Dated this _/fTday 
ount of $60, Cynthia 
0, Sansstrom $273.25, 
tion^$350.71. 
b*u». 
TIMOTHY R^. HANSOls^^ 
district Courts Judge 
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FILED BISTiieT mMl 
Third Judicial District 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT? 2005 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF T T T m ^ ^ v f e ^ T ^ ) 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
AZHARN AL FATLAWI, 
Defendant. 
SPECIAL VERDICT 
Count I 
Case No. 041905314 
We, the Jurors impaneled in the above case, find the defendant, Azharn Al Fatlawi, 
X Guilty 
Not Guilty 
of Aggravated Robbery as charged in Count I of the Information. 
If you find the defendant, Azham Al Fatlawi, guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of 
Aggravated Robbery as charged in Count I of the information, please answer the following: 
We, the jury, further 
X do 
do not 
find from all the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt that in committing the offense 
of Aggravated Robbery the defendant, Azharn Al Fatlawi used a dangerous weapon, to wit: a 
gun. 
We, the jury, further 
X do 
do not 
find from all the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt that in committing the offense 
of Aggravated Robbery the defendant, Azharn Al Fatlawi acted in concert with two or more 
persons. 
DATED this J^\ day of April, 2005. 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 
3 THE COURT: State of Utah vs. Azharn Alfatlawi, 
4 041905314. It is on for sentencing. The record will show 
5 Mr. Alfatlawi is present. The record will also show 
6 Mr. Alfatlawi was convicted by a jury of six counts of 
7 aggravated robbery, with firearms and gang enhancements, all 
8 first-degree felonies; and one count of aggravated burglary, a 
9 first-degree felony, also with firearms and gang enhancements. 
10 After the jury's verdict in this matter I requested a 
11 presentence report. I have received and reviewed that. 
12 Mr. Simms, have you seen it? 
13 MR. SIMMS: I have, your Honor. 
14 THE COURT: Have you discussed it with your client? 
15 MR. SIMMS: Yes. 
16 THE COURT: Are you ready to proceed? 
17 MR. SIMMS: Yes, your Honor. The only correction I 
18 would make to the presentence report, factual correction, is 
19 that the presentence report states Mr. Alfatlawi did not accept 
20 a plea bargain. There was no plea bargain in this case. 
21 Mr. Alfatlawi was offered to plead to everything straight up. 
22 So there was no plea bargain. He, as indicated in the 
23 presentence report, maintains his innocence. And he is in 
24 custody. I think at some point --
25 THE COURT: He is in prison on a prior offense. 
MR. SIMMS: That's correct, it is a third-degree 
stolen motor vehicle. And he does look forward to being a 
productive member of society. He has worked in the past for a 
moving company, claims he has very strong family support. We 
would ask if the Court does send him to prison, or give him an 
additional sentence to prison, that it would be concurrent. He 
did turn himself in once his family was contacted. Again, if 
the Court does sentence him, we would ask for concurrent. 
THE COURT: Mr. Alfatlawi, do you have anything you 
want to say? 
THE DEFENDANT: I just hope that you run them 
concurrent, your Honor. Thank you. 
MR. BURMESTER: Your Honor, this general matrix thing 
is a bit of a mistery to me. But it appears from my reading of 
it that the weapon used in current offense only when current 
conviction does not reflect weapon use, they appear to have 
added the three, and it doesn't seem like it should be applied. 
So I think that would be a correction, the total number being 
23 as opposed to 26. I don't think it makes a meaningful 
difference, but I just want to make sure it is accurately 
portrayed. 
THE COURT: Everybody agrees the firearm enhancements 
apply and the so-called gang enhancements apply. 
MR. BURMESTER: Yes. Your Honor, in this case, the 
State is, of course, asking for consecutive sentences, that 
4 
they all be consecutive to each other, and that they be served 
consecutive to his current term. There are a number of reasons 
to justify that. 
First of all, the vulnerability of the victims. I 
would like to bring the Court's attention at least one of the 
victims is present, although he has expressed to me he doesn't 
desire to address the Court, just wishes to see what takes 
place today. As the Court is well aware, many times in cases 
like this, the victims place themselves in places they 
shouldn't have been, or what have you, but in this they were 
truly innocent victims who were just going about their lives, 
and many of them were vulnerable, especially vulnerable 
victims. 
The defendant was out on parole for seven days before 
he began this crime spree, getting out on July 30, and the 
first crime committed on August 6. He has dedicated his life, 
it would appear, to a life of crime, since the ripe old age of 
12 years old. This has resulted in his being placed in 
numerous juvenile and adult programs, probation situations, 
which, of course, he has failed at in every instance. This 
particular crime spree lasted for a couple of days, and his 
many victims shows that he presents a continuing threat to the 
community at large, just because of there is no relation, you 
are just a citizen who is out there on the street, you could be 
his next victim. 
5 
In this report, to the report author, he accepts no 
responsibility, placing the blame on some conspiracy or 
something of the codefendants to blame him for, I think it was 
pretty clear to the jury and the evidence presented in this 
case that he is actually the leader of this group and the 
gunman of this group. 
Finally, Judge, the greatest insult of all is that he 
places the blame for his conviction on the jury, citizens who 
were questioned about their willingness to look beyond issues 
of race or religion or even tattoos, and he blames them for 
convicting him because of his nationality. I think that 
impugns their integrity and the integrity of this court system 
that we have, with absolutely no evidence. In fact, the 
evidence is to the contrary. These citizens swore to follow 
the law as you instructed them. And, in fact, they acquitted 
him of one charge. How could, if they were really making some 
sort of statement about nationality, certainly they would have 
convicted him of everything. 
For all those reasons, your Honor, he has well earned 
consecutive sentences on each one of these cases as well as to 
the count he is currently serving. 
THE COURT: Mr. Simms? 
MR. SIMMS: We have nothing further. 
Do you have anything to add? 
THE DEFENDANT: I didn't do this crime. 
6 
THE COURT: Unfortunately, Mr. Alfatlawi, your 
victims recalled you, your two cohorts identified you as being 
involved, and there was just a ton of evidence to support 
conviction in this case. 
Let me make sure I understand the current status of 
the statute, counsel. The offenses that are committed in 
concert with two or more persons carry an enhanced penalty, 
with regard to the enhancement for a first-degree felony, it 
makes it, rather than a five to life, it is nine to life, isn't 
it? 
MR. BURMESTER: That's the way I understand the 
statute, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Then there is a firearm enhancement that 
adds one year. So each one of these is ten to life. 
MR. BURMESTER: That's the way I understand it, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Do you agree? 
MR. SIMMS: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Alfatlawi, having been found guilty 
of I believe it was six -- yes -- six counts of aggravated 
robbery, first-degree felonies involving the use of a firearm 
and in concert with two or more persons, the crimes being 
committed with two or more persons, it is the judgment of this 
Court that you be incarcerated in the Utah State Prison on each 
one of those counts for a period of not less than ten years, 
7 
maybe for the rest of your life. The ten years is based upon 
an enhancement for the acting in concert with two or more 
persons, that makes the sentence, rather than five to life, 
nine to life; and because a firearm was used, the statute 
requires the imposition of a sentence that adds an additional 
one year on the bottom; so that makes it ten years on each 
count. 
Also having pled guilty -- excuse me — having been 
convicted of aggravated burglary, a first-degree felony, again 
involving a firearm and the so-called gang enhancements, it is 
likewise the judgment of this Court that you be sentenced to a 
term in the Utah State Prison of not less than ten and maybe 
for as long as the rest of your life. 
I am not going to impose any fines in any of these 
matters, because you wonf t be paying any fines. 
To the extent you do have some financial resources in 
the future, the victim Mr. Kingston is owed $60. I order 
restitution in that amount. Cynthia Osman is owed $1,700 for 
the robbery of her store. Natalie Clark is owed $180 she lost 
in trying to deal with this robbery that went towards her. 
Lawrence Yorganson has restitution coming in the amount of 
$500. Marjorie Sandstrom has restitution coming in the amount 
of $273.25; her insurance carrier, when you took her car, had 
to make some expense payments of $953.40. That's State Farm. 
Restitution is ordered to State Farm in that amount. The Utah 
8 
State Office of Crime Victim Reparations has paid in behalf of 
or to Ms. Sandstrom the amount of $350.71, Those are all 
ordered as restitution. The final victim, Christopher Dean, 
you were only able to get five dollars from him. So he has 
restitution coming in the amount of five dollars. 
Mr. Alfatlawi, the only issue is whether these are 
consecutive or concurrent. When I look at this I am really 
quite surprised. You and your family were apparently given 
political asylum from Iraq, allowed to come to this country to 
escape what many people in Iraq, before the current situation 
over there occurred, some rather brutal treatment by a rather 
brutal dictator. I assume the reason you were given political 
asylum is you were not on his list of most favorite people. 
Had this country not done that, you would probably be in one of 
those mass graves over there. But what we did in this country, 
we gave you political asylum, we allowed you to come here, 
along with your family, and enjoy the benefits of living in 
this country. And what thanks has this country got for it? We 
got someone who commits crimes, goes to prison, has been — 
THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, I didn't do this crime. 
THE COURT: Just a minute. You keep your mouth shut. 
I have given you your chance to be heard. I don't want to hear 
any more. Now is my turn to talk. 
You come over here, take advantage of that, you have 
been involved in the criminal justice system since you were 
9 
very young, I know a lot about this case because we tried it. 
I know the trauma the victims went through. 
THE DEFENDANT: I don!t even care. You can just run 
it consecutive. I don't give a fuck. I don't. I don't give a 
fuck. Fuck you, you mother fuckers. We riders. We don't give 
a fuck. We die for this shit, where I am from, from Iraq, you 
mother fucker. We die, you mother fucker. We riders, you 
mother fucker. We die for this shit, punk. I will fuck you up 
and your fucking family, you bitch, you fucking punk, you 
mother fucker. 
THE COURT: Take him out. 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, take me out, bitch. I'll fuck 
you up and your family and your daughter, bitch. Remember 
that. 
THE COURT: If that's the kind of people we got over 
in Iraq, maybe we ought to get out. I suspect that's not the 
case. I suspect there are good people, just like everywhere 
else in the world. Mr. Alfatlawi is not one of them. He is a 
criminal of the worst kind. He preys on people that are 
minding their own business. He robbed a store here where a 
lady was trying to make a new store work, in the middle of the 
night. They took advantage of a widow in the Cove area, who 
went out to try and give assistance, and they terrorized her. 
A man coming home, unloading his baggage in his home, they 
robbed. A young woman walking down the street, who was out of 
10 
gas, in the night, coming home from work, they attempted to rob 
her. She didn't have anything, so they couldn't take it. 
Random acts of violence, for example, on Mr. Dean. This is 
just outside the pizza store on 13th there. They pull up and 
point a gun at him and demand his money. He only has five 
dollars, but he gives it to them. And on and on and on. 
This is the kind of guy that ought to be off the 
street for a long period of time, as long as I can make it. 
Considering his attitude, if the Board of Pardons let's him out 
in other than a box, they are nuts, because he will do this 
again. It is too bad we can't deport him back to Iraq. If I 
had any say-so about it, that's exactly where he would go, and 
he can deal with the situation over there. He would last about 
20 minutes, with his attitude. 
But, in any event, Mr. Alfatlawi has earned and he 
gets from me a consecutive sentence on each one of these. They 
all run consecutively. By my count it is 70 years to life. I 
realize the statute may not allow that, but the Board of 
Pardons, if they want to reduce it to 30 to life, it is their 
business, but not me. This guy deserves to be in prison for a 
long, long time. Commitment forthwith. You can give him the 
good news, Mr. Simms. 
MR. SIMMS: The loss that I show in the presentence 
report from Cynthia Osman is $700. 
THE COURT: That's true. I did get that late. 
11 
1 MR. SIMMS: $700 on Count II 
2 THE COURT: $700 even? 
3 MR. BURMESTER: That's what it appears to me. 
4 THE COURT: $1,700, based upon the memorandum from 
5 I Adult Probation and Parole. 
6 MR. BURMESTER: I have not seen that. 
7 THE COURT: $1,700. That's what I said. Tell 
8 Mr. Alfatlawi to have a nice life, 
9 I (This proceeding was concluded.) 
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Supreme Court of Montana. 
STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
George Paul GUILLAUME, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 97-291 
Heard Sept. 16, 1998. 
Submitted Nov. 12, 1998. 
Decided Feb. 19, 1999. 
Following jury trial, defendant was convicted in the District Court, Cascade County, 
Thomas M. McKittrick, J., of felony assault and criminal trespass to property, and 
sentenced to ten years' imprisonment for felony assault with additional five-year term for 
use of weapon, as well as six-month term for criminal trespass to be served concurrently 
with 15-year term. Defendant appealed. The Supreme Court, Hunt, J., held that: (1) 
application of weapon enhancement statute to felony convictions where a underlying 
offense requires proof of use of weapon violates the double jeopardy provision of 
Montana Constitution, and (2) application of weapon enhancement to increase term for 
conviction of felony assault, which required proof of use of weapon to elevate crime from 
misdemeanor, violated state double jeopardy protection against multiple punishments for 
single crime. 
Sentencing order reversed and remanded. 
Leaphart, J., filed specially concurring opinion. 
Nelson, J., filed dissenting opinion, in which Turnage, C.J., and Gray, J., concurred. 
*313 Ronald L. Bissell, Cascade County Public Defender's Office, Great Falls, Montana, 
for Appellant. 
Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General, Carol Schmidt, Assistant Attorney General, 
Helena, Montana; Brant Light, Cascade County Attorney, Michael Rausch, Deputy 
Cascade County Attorney, Great Falls, Montana, for Respondent. 
Justice WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR. delivered the Opinion of the Court. 
H 1 Following a jury trial in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Cascade County, George 
Paul Guillaume (Guillaume) was found guilty of felony assault and criminal trespass to 
property, a misdemeanor. The District Court sentenced Guillaume to ten years in prison 
for felony assault, an additional five years in prison for use of a weapon, and six months 
in prison for criminal trespass to property, the six-month term to run concurrently with 
the fifteen-year term. Guillaume appeals that part of the court's order sentencing him to 
ten years in prison for felony assault and an additional five years in prison for use of a 
weapon on the basis of double jeopardy. We reverse and remand for resentencing. 
% 2 The sole issue on appeal is whether application of the weapon enhancement statute, § 
46-18-221, MCA, to a conviction for felony assault, a violation of § 45-5-202(2)(b), 
MCA, violates the double jeopardy provision of Article II, Section 25 of the Montana 
Constitution? 
If 3 The following facts are not disputed. On July 6, 1996, at approximately 3:15 a.m., 
Jodi Vellucci (Vellucci), a neighbor of Robert Bielen (Bielen), observed through her 
window a light in the unattached garage of Bielen. She also noticed that the walk-in door 
to the garage was open. Vellucci immediately told Bielen what she had seen, and Bielen 
went to the garage to investigate. As Bielen approached the garage, Guillaume exited the 
garage. Guillaume saw Bielen, held up a hammer that he had taken from the garage, and 
exclaimed, Til kill you." Guillaume swung the hammer at Bielen's head. Bielen reacted 
in such a way that the hammer missed his head but struck his hand. A struggle ensued 
and Guillaume escaped by jumping the fence. Guillaume was later apprehended by the 
police. Bielen told the police that he thought Guillaume was going to kill him when 
Guillaume swung the hammer at his head. 
*314 Tf 4 Guillaume was charged by information with felony assault, a violation of § 45-
5-202(2)(b), MCA, and criminal trespass to property, a misdemeanor, a violation of § 45-
6-203, MCA. A jury trial was held on January 27-28, 1997, and Guillaume was found 
guilty on all counts. On February 27, 1997, the District Court held a sentencing hearing. 
The court sentenced Guillaume to ten years in prison for felony assault, an additional five 
years in prison for use of a weapon pursuant to § 46-18-221, MCA (hereinafter the 
weapon enhancement statute), and six months in prison for criminal trespass to property, 
the six-month term to run concurrently with the fifteen-year term. The court stated that 
the reasons for the sentence were Guillaume's prior criminal history and the severity of 
the offense. The court emphasized the fact that Guillaume threatened and tried to kill 
Bielen with a hammer. 
Tj 5 On March 11, 1997, Guillaume filed a motion to reconsider sentencing on the ground 
that application of the weapon enhancement statute to his felony assault conviction 
violated the double jeopardy provision of the Montana Constitution. The court denied 
Guillaume's motion and issued its sentencing order on March 21, 1997. This appeal 
followed. 
TJ 6 Does application of the weapon enhancement statute, § 46-18-221, MCA, to a 
conviction for felony assault, a violation of § 45-5-202(2)(b), MCA, violate the 
double jeopardy provision of Article II, Section 25 of the Montana Constitution? 
J^ 7 The denial of Guillaume's motion for reconsideration of his sentence involves a legal 
question that we review de novo to determine whether the District Court's interpretation 
of the law is correct. State v. Zabawa(\996\ 279 Mont. 307, 310, 928 P.2d 151, 153. 
Tl 8 The double jeopardy provision of Article II, Section 25 of the Montana Constitution 
provides in part: "No person shall be again put in jeopardy for the same offense 
previously tried in any jurisdiction." This provision protects defendants from both 
multiple prosecutions for offenses arising out of the same transaction, and multiple 
punishments imposed at a single prosecution for the same offense. State v. Savaria 
(1997), 284 Mont. 216, 222, 945 P.2d 24, 28. See also State v. Vargas (1996), 279 Mont. 
357, 360, 928 P.2d 165, 167; State v. Nelson (1996), 275 Mont. 86, 90, 910 P.2d 247, 
250. In the instant case, Guillaume maintains that application of the weapon enhancement 
statute to his conviction for felony assault violated his right to be free from multiple 
punishments for the same offense. 
J^ 9 Guillaume was sentenced to ten years in prison for commission of felony assault. The 
statute defining felony assault provides in relevant part: 
A person commits the offense of felony assault if the person purposely or knowingly 
causes ... reasonable apprehension of serious bodily injury in another by use of a weapon. 
Section 45-5-202(2)(b), MCA. Guillaume's sentence was enhanced by five years pursuant 
to the weapon enhancement statute. That statute provides in relevant part: 
A person who has been found guilty of any offense and who, while engaged in the 
commission of the offense, knowingly ... used a ... dangerous weapon shall, in addition to 
the punishment provided for the commission of such offense, be sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment in the state prison of not less than 2 years or more than 10 years.... An 
additional sentence prescribed by this section shall run consecutively to the sentence 
provided for the offense. 
Section 46-18-221(1) and (4), MCA. Guillaume asserts that had he not used a weapon in 
the struggle with Bielen, his actions would have fit the charge of misdemeanor assault, 
the penalty for which is imprisonment of no more than six months or a fine of no more 
than $500. See Section 45-5-201(1 )(d) and (2), MCA ("A person commits the offense of 
assault if he ... purposely or knowingly causes reasonable apprehension of bodily injury 
in another"). Guillaume asserts that the only factor raising his charge from misdemeanor 
assault to felony assault was his use of a weapon. Based on this distinction between 
misdemeanor and felony assault, Guillaume argues that the felony assault statute *315 
provides by its own terms for enhanced punishment for use of a weapon, and that 
application of the weapon enhancement statute to his conviction for felony assault 
effectively punished him twice for use of a weapon. This, Guillaume argues, is exactly 
what the double jeopardy provision was designed to prohibit. 
Tf 10 In arguing his position, Guillaume does not dispute that the weapon enhancement 
statute is constitutional on its face. Guillaume acknowledges that this Court has 
repeatedly held that Montana's weapon enhancement statute is a sentencing factor, and 
does not create a separate crime or element of a crime in violation of the protection 
against double jeopardy. State v. Krantz (1990), 241 Mont. 501, 512, 788 P.2d 298, 305 
(citing State v. Forsyth (1988), 233 Mont. 389, 423, 761 P.2d 363, 384; State v. 
Spurlock(\9S7\ 225 Mont. 238, 241, 731 P.2d 1315, 1317; State v. Davison (1980), 188 
Mont. 432, 445, 614 P.2d 489, 497). However, Guillaume argues that the weapon 
enhancement statute is unconstitutional as applied to him. See State v. Crisp (1991), 249 
Mont. 199, 202, 814 P.2d 981, 983 (A defendant may challenge a statute's 
constitutionality by arguing that it is unconstitutional on its face or that it is 
unconstitutional as applied to his particular situation). Specifically, Guillaume argues that 
when use of a weapon is an element of the underlying offense, as it is in this case, it is a 
violation of double jeopardy to also apply the weapon enhancement statute. 
TJ 11 Guillaume acknowledges that in Zabawa, a case involving facts nearly identical to 
the instant case, this Court held that application of the weapon enhancement statute to a 
conviction for felony assault did not violate the double jeopardy provision of the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. Zabawa, 279 Mont, at 316, 928 P.2d at 
156-57. However, Guillaume notes that we left unresolved in Zabawa the question 
whether application of the weapon enhancement statute to a conviction for felony assault 
violates the double jeopardy provision of Article II, Section 25, of the Montana 
Constitution. Zabawa, 279 Mont, at 310, 928 P.2d at 153. Our reasons for not addressing 
Zabawa's double jeopardy challenge under the Montana Constitution were as follows: 
[Zabawa] claims no greater protection from double jeopardy under Article II, Section 25 
of the Montana Constitution than under the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.... [Zabawa has] relied entirely on federal interpretations under the United 
States Constitution during oral argument; in Zabawa's,view, those interpretations 
supported his argument under that Constitution. Accordingly, we address only the double 
jeopardy protection afforded under the United States Constitution, leaving for resolution 
in a future case ... whether Article II, Section 25 of the Montana Constitution provides 
greater protection from double jeopardy than is provided by the United States 
Constitution. 
Zabawa, 279 Mont, at 310, 928 P.2d at 153. 
f 12 Guillaume states that the instant case now presents the question left open in Zabawa. 
Guillaume claims that Article II, Section 25 of the Montana Constitution affords greater 
protection from double jeopardy than does the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. In support of his claim, Guillaume undertakes an analysis of legislative 
intent similar to that employed in Zabawa, see Zabawa, 279 Mont, at 313-16, 928 P.2d at 
155-57, and ultimately concludes that, in enacting the weapon enhancement statute, the 
Montana Legislature did not intend to impose multiple punishments where the underlying 
offense requires proof of use of a weapon as an element of the offense. 
Tf 13 We agree with Guillaume that Article II, Section 25 of the Montana Constitution 
provides greater protection from double jeopardy than is provided by the United States 
Constitution. However, we do not reach this conclusion on the basis of legislative intent. 
Zabawa is distinguishable from and has no bearing upon the instant case. In Zabawa, this 
Court was faced with a question of federal constitutional law and was bound to follow 
federal court decisions interpreting that law. Zabawa, 279 Mont, at 310, 928 P.2d at 153. 
Specifically, we were bound to follow Missouri v. Hunter (1983), 459 U.S. 359, 103 
S.Ct. 673, 74 L.Ed.2d 535, wherein *316 the United States Supreme Court held that, 
where legislative intent is clear, cumulative punishments imposed in a single trial do not 
violate the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. Hunter, 459 U.S. at 366, 103 S.Ct. at 678. The Court reasoned: 
With respect to cumulative sentences imposed in a single trial, the Double Jeopardy 
Clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater 
punishment than the legislature intended. 
Hunter, 459 U.S. at 359, 103 S.Ct. at 678. Instructed by Hunter, this Court inquired into 
whether, in enacting the weapon enhancement statute, the Montana Legislature intended 
to impose multiple punishments where the underlying offense requires proof of the use of 
a weapon as an element of the offense. Zabawa, 279 Mont, at 313, 928 P.2d at 155. We 
answered that question in the affirmative. Zabawa, 279 Mont, at 316, 928 P.2d at 156-57. 
T| 14 Unlike Zabawa, the issue in the instant case is one of Montana constitutional law. 
The [Montana] Constitution vests in the courts the exclusive power to construe and 
interpret legislative Acts, as well as provisions of the Constitution. Inherent in this power 
is the responsibility to determine whether a particular law conforms to the Constitution. 
In re License Revocation of Gilder sleeve (1997), 283 Mont. 479, 484, 942 P.2d 705, 708 
(citations omitted). As Justice Leaphart noted in his dissent to Zabawa: 
Constitutional guarantees are not mere vessels to be left empty or filled at the whim of 
the legislative branch. Rather, they have intrinsic meaning which is independent of any 
legislative intent. 
Zabawa, 279 Mont, at 323-24, 928 P.2d at 161. Thus, pursuant to the doctrine of 
separation of powers embodied in Article III, Section 1 of the Montana Constitution, and 
pursuant to our duty to safeguard the rights and guarantees provided by this state's 
Constitution, and notwithstanding legislative intent, we must apply the protection 
afforded by the double jeopardy provision of Article II, Section 25 of the Montana 
Constitution. 
f 1 5 This Court has long embraced the principle that the rights and guarantees afforded 
by the United States Constitution are minimal, and that states may interpret provisions of 
their own constitutions to afford greater protection than the United States Constitution. 
State v. Johnson (1986), 221 Mont. 503, 512, 719 P.2d 1248, 1254 (citations omitted). In 
interpreting the Montana Constitution, this Court has repeatedly refused to "march lock-
step" with the United States Supreme Court, even where the state constitutional provision 
at issue is nearly identical to its federal counterpart. See e.g., Ranta v. State, 1998 MT 95, 
288 Mont. 391, 55 St.Rep. 378, 958 P.2d 670 (holding that sentence review is a "critical 
stage" to which the right of counsel attaches); State v. Bullock (1995), 272 Mont. 361, 
901 P.2d 61 (holding that a person may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in land 
that extends beyond the curtilage of his residence); State v. Johnson (1986), 221 Mont. 
503, 719 P.2d 1248 (holding that defendant's statement that he would like to talk to 
"somebody" invoked his right to counsel). 
TJ 16 Thus, as we have done in the past, we again refuse to march lock-step with the 
United States Supreme Court in interpreting the protection afforded by the double 
jeopardy provision of Article II, Section 25 of the Montana Constitution. We hold that 
Article II, Section 25 of the Montana Constitution affords greater protection against 
multiple punishments for the same offense than does the Fifth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. We further hold that application of the weapon enhancement statute 
to felony convictions where the underlying offense requires proof of use of a weapon 
violates the double jeopardy provision of Article II, Section 25 of the Montana 
Constitution. 
J^ 17 In so holding, we are guided by the fundamental principle embodied in double 
jeopardy. Simply put, double jeopardy exemplifies the legal and moral concept that no 
person should suffer twice for a single act. Although simply stated, the concept of double 
jeopardy does not appear to be simply applied. One commentator notes: 
*317 The double jeopardy clause has been the source of more confusion than 
enlightenment. The reason for this is to be found in the history of double jeopardy, in its 
varied sources, in its uneven development, [and] in its deceptively simple phraseology. It 
is easier to pay lip service to a principle than to give that principle life and meaning. 
Jay A. Sigler, Double Jeopardy: The Development of a Legal and Social Policy 117 
(1969). While several cases have presented courts with difficult double jeopardy 
questions, this case is not one of them. Under the facts of the instant case, double 
jeopardy is simply applied. 
% 18 The only factor raising Guillaume's charge from misdemeanor assault to felony 
assault was his use of a weapon. We interpret this distinction between the two offenses, 
and the different penalties imposed by each offense, as the legislature's way of punishing 
a criminal defendant for use of a weapon in committing an assault. Thus, when the 
weapon enhancement statute was applied to Guillaume's felony assault conviction, 
Guillaume was subjected to double punishment for use of a weapon: once when the 
charge was elevated from misdemeanor assault to felony assault, and again when the 
weapon enhancement statute was applied. We agree with Guillaume that this form of 
double punishment is exactly what double jeopardy was intended to prohibit. 
Tj 19 The State argues that the double jeopardy clause of the Montana Constitution does 
not protect against multiple punishments for the same offense because such protection is 
not explicit in the clause. We disagree with the State's argument because it runs counter 
to prior precedent, see Savaria, 284 Mont, at 222, 945 P.2d at 28, and Vargas, 279 Mont, 
at 360, 928 P.2d at 167, and the principle that the rights and guarantees afforded by the 
United States Constitution are minimal. See Johnson, 221 Mont, at 512, 719 P.2d at 1254. 
In North Carolina v. Pearce (1969), 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2076, 23 L.Ed.2d 
656, 664-65, the United States Supreme Court held that the double jeopardy clause of the 
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects against multiple punishments 
for the same offense. Because the double jeopardy clause of the federal constitution 
protects against multiple punishments for the same offense, the double jeopardy clause of 
the Montana Constitution provides at least the same protection. Moreover, it makes sense 
that "double jeopardy applies to multiple punishments because, if it did not, then the 
prohibition against multiple prosecutions would be meaningless; a court could simply 
achieve the same effect as a second prosecution by resentencing a criminal defendant 
after the defendant had served all or part of an initial sentence." Ex Parte Lange (1873), 
85 U.S. 163, 175, 21 L.Ed. 872, 878, 18 Wall. 163. 
TI 20 Second, the State argues that application of the weapon enhancement statute to 
Guillaume's felony assault conviction results in only one punishment, not two. As support 
for its position, the State cites Davison, wherein this Court held that the weapon 
enhancement statute is a sentencing factor, and does not create a separate offense. 
Davison, 188 Mont, at 447, 614 P.2d at 498. On this basis, the State argues that "any 
supposed" protection against multiple punishments is not implicated in this case. Further, 
the State argues that the separation of powers doctrine prohibits this Court from 
infringing on the Montana Legislature's exclusive power, embodied in Article V, Section 
11 of the Montana Constitution, to determine appropriate punishments for criminal 
offenses. 
Tf 21 Although the State has correctly cited the above authorities, its reliance on them is 
misplaced. Davison is inapposite to the issue being decided in this case. The issue is not 
whether Guillaume committed two offenses by use of a weapon; rather, the issue is 
whether Guillaume was punished twice for use of a weapon. On this point, the same 
commentator cited above summarizes the thoughts of many double jeopardy critics: 
The need for clarification of double jeopardy is indubitable. One necessary distinction is 
that between double prosecution and double punishment. In determining this question, 
inquiry should be concentrated upon the nature of the defendant's conduct, [and] the 
physical character of the criminal transaction, rather than upon the *318 number of 
offenses arising from the transaction. The protection against multiple punishment has as 
its rationale the belief that the defendant's punishment should be commensurate with but 
not greater than his criminal liability. 
Sigler, supra, at 193. 
Tf 22 The argument that application of the weapon enhancement statute to a felony assault 
conviction results in only one punishment for use of a weapon, rather than two, is one of 
pure semantics. Were we to accept this argument, we would in effect strip double 
jeopardy of all meaning. We refuse to merely pay lip service to the fundamental principle 
of double jeopardy. 
TI23 Although it is true that the Montana Constitution confers upon the legislature the 
power to set appropriate punishments for criminal acts, see Art. V, Sec. 11, Mont. Const., 
this power is not unbridled. The double jeopardy clause of Article II, Section 25 of the 
Montana Constitution prohibits the legislature from imposing on criminal defendants 
multiple punishments for the same offense. As previously stated, this Court is vested with 
the exclusive power to review whether a particular legislative act conforms to the 
Constitution. Gildersleeve, 283 Mont, at 484, 942 P.2d at 708. We conclude that our 
holding in the instant case does not violate the separation of powers doctrine. 
Tf 24 The State further argues that any perceived double jeopardy violation in this case is 
really a product of legislative drafting. The State asserts that a fifteen-year prison term 
could have been imposed on Guillaume had the legislature increased the prison time for 
felony assault within the felony assault statute and excluded the offense of felony assault 
in the application of the weapon enhancement statute. The State argues that the 
legislature's ability to modify the felony assault penalty to achieve the same result that is 
achieved in the present sentencing scheme demonstrates that no double jeopardy 
violation exists in this case. We disagree. The fact that modification of the felony assault 
statute could achieve the same result as the present sentencing scheme does not mean that 
no double jeopardy violation exists in this case. 
f 25 We reverse the District Court's sentencing order and remand for rehearing and 
resentencing consistent with this opinion. 
JIM REGNIER, W. WILLIAM LEAPHART, and TERRY N. TRIEWEILER, JJ., concur. 
Justice W. WILLIAM LEAPHART, specially concurring. 
U 26 I specially concur with the opinion of the Court and I write separately to address 
some of the comments set forth in the dissent. Justice Nelson posits that, Article II, 
Section 25 of the Montana Constitution, by its plain language, clearly provides less 
protection against double jeopardy than the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 
He quotes the language of Article II, Section 25—"No person shall be again put in 
jeopardy for the same offense previously tried in any jurisdiction"—and observes that 
there "is certainly no textual mention of any protection from multiple punishments." 
From this observation, he suggests that the only reason that Article II, Section 25 affords 
protection against multiple punishments is because the Fifth Amendment does and 
because, under well accepted principles of federalism, we cannot interpret our 
constitution as providing any less protection. 
% 27 Justice Nelson attributes more textual substance to the Fifth Amendment than it is 
due. In fact, when one compares the language of the two constitutional guarantees, the 
Montana Constitution is the more specific. The Fifth Amendment merely states: "[N]or 
shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or 
limb[.]" U.S. Const, amend. V. There is no mention of any protection other than not 
being twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense. Contrary to the logic of Justice 
Nelson's dissent, the Fifth Amendment makes no textual mention of punishment, multiple 
punishment, prosecutions or offenses "tried" in any jurisdiction. It merely invokes the 
concept of "jeopardy." 
TI 28 Both this Court and the U.S. Supreme Court have interpreted their respective *319 
double jeopardy clauses as offering protection against three distinct abuses: a second 
prosecution for the same offense following an acquittal; a second prosecution for the 
same offense following a conviction; and multiple punishments for the same offense. 
State v. Nelson (1996), 275 Mont. 86, 90, 910 P.2d 247, 250; United States v. Halper 
(1989), 490 U.S. 435, 440, 109 S.Ct.J892, 1897, 104 L.Ed.2d 487, 496. These 
interpretations cannot be traced to the plain language of either constitutional provision 
since neither constitution makes any reference to prosecutions, punishments, convictions 
or acquittals. Rather, the interpretations derive from the concept of jeopardy--a term that 
is used in both documents. Jeopardy is the danger of conviction and punishment incurred 
by a defendant when he or she is put on trial for a criminal charge. See Black's Law 
Dictionary 835 (6th ed.1990). 
Tj 29 Thus, when we interpret the Montana Constitution as affording protection against 
multiple punishments, we do so, not because the text of the United States Constitution 
sets this as an express minimum—indeed, it makes no direct reference to punishment—but 
because the Montana Constitution, like the U.S. Constitution, specifically protects against 
double "jeopardy." In addressing the question of whether Article II, Section 25 protects 
against enhanced punishments for use of a weapon, we therefore interpret the concept of 
"jeopardy" as that word is used in the text of the Montana Constitution, independently of 
how it has been interpreted in the U.S. Constitution. 
Tf 30 As both the Court and the dissent recognize, the Bill of Rights Committee saw to it 
that our constitution prohibits the existing federal practice of allowing a person already 
tried in another jurisdiction to be again tried by the State of Montana. This fact alone 
illustrates that "jeopardy," as that word is used in our constitution, has a more expansive 
meaning than it does in the federal constitution. Given that the concept of "jeopardy" 
appears independently in the Montana Constitution and given further that it offers 
broader protection from multiple prosecutions than the U.S. Constitution, why would we 
turn to the federal courts to ascertain whether or not the Montana Constitution protects 
against enhanced punishments? Where in the transcripts of the Constitutional Convention 
is there any support for the proposition, adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Missouri 
v. Hunter (1983), 459 U.S. 359, 103 S.Ct. 673, 74 L.Ed.2d 535, that the Double Jeopardy 
Clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater 
punishment than the legislature intended? According to the U.S. Supreme Court's 
interpretation of the Fifth Amendment, the protection against multiple punishments has 
no inherent constitutional significance; it means only what Congress, or the legislature, 
through statutory enactment, says it means. However, as I stated in my dissent in State v. 
Zabawa (1996), 279 Mont. 307, 928 P.2d 151, "[constitutional guarantees are not mere 
vessels to be left empty or filled at the whim of the legislative branch. Rather, they have 
intrinsic meaning which is independent of any legislative intent." Zabawa, 279 Mont, at 
323-24, 928 P.2d at 161 (Leaphart, J., dissenting). If the prohibition against multiple 
punishments is to have any efficacy, it must have some constitutional essence which is 
beyond legislative amendment or interpretation. If, as both state and federal courts agree, 
double jeopardy proscribes multiple punishments for the same offense, the inescapable 
conclusion is that the enhancement provision of § 46-18-221, MCA, is an additional and 
second punishment for use of a weapon in an assault. As such, it is a multiple punishment 
in violation of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy found in Article II, 
Section 25 of the Montana Constitution. 
Tj 31 If the protection against double punishments has any meaning, it must certainly 
encompass a statute which "enhances" punishment for use of a weapon after a defendant 
has already been punished for use of a weapon in the underlying offense. To hold 
otherwise, leaves the constitutional guarantee an empty, meaningless promise. 
Justice JAMES C. NELSON dissents. 
U 32 I cannot agree with the Court's decision in this case. As facially appealing as is *320 
its approach to the question of whether Montana's double jeopardy provision, Article II, 
Section 25, provides greater protection against multiple punishments than does the Fifth 
Amendment, the majority's conclusion that it does is not supported by a shred of legal 
authority. Reduced to its essentials, the Court concludes that Article II, Section 25, 
provides this greater protection for no other reason than that we say it does. 
Tf 33 Understandably, the Court does notjely on any argument made by Guillaume. His 
entire brief and oral argument was devoted, not to developing any legal basis for the 
majority's holding here, but, rather, to simply rehashing why, in State v. Zabawa (1996), 
279 Mont. 307, 928 P.2d 151, the dissent was right and the Court was wrong. He, like the 
majority, utterly failed to develop any independent and legally supportable theory based 
upon the language of Article II, Section 25, or its history in the 1971-72 Constitutional 
Convention that would justify the holding that this Court has reached. The Court does no 
better in its opinion. In fact, the majority pointedly ignores the legislative history of 
Article II, Section 25~no doubt because it could not find in the transcripts of the 
Constitutional Convention any support for its interpretation. 
|^ 34 Indeed, it is clear that the Bill of Rights Committee was concerned, not with 
expanding the protections already provided by the Fifth Amendment, but rather, it was 
determined only that Montana's Constitution prohibit the existing federal practice of 
allowing a person already tried in one jurisdiction to be again tried by the State. See 
Montana Constitutional Convention, Verbatim Transcript, Vol. II, at p. 641 and Vol. V, 
at pp. 1776-79. 
Tf 35 In truth, by its plain language, Article II, Section 25, provides less protection against 
double jeopardy than does the Fifth Amendment. In pertinent part, Montana's double 
jeopardy clause states unambiguously that: 
No person shall be again put in jeopardy for the same offense previously tried in any 
jurisdiction. 
There is no mention in Article II, Section 25, of any protection other than not being tried 
twice for the same offense. There is certainly no textual mention of any protection from 
multiple punishments. As the majority does recognize, the only reason why Article II, 
Section 25, provides as much protection as does the Fifth Amendment is because we 
cannot constitutionally interpret Montana's Double Jeopardy Clause as providing less— 
notwithstanding that would be the obvious conclusion from a simple reading of the text 
of Article II, Section 25, itself. And, it is precisely because the protections afforded by 
Article II, Section 25, are coextensive with the Fifth Amendment that our decision in 
Zabawa—which was based upon federal law—remains correct. 
% 36 The majority states that it refuses to "pay lip service" to the fundamental principle of 
double jeopardy. More correctly, it refuses to pay lip service to the plain language of 
Article II, Section 25. Refusing "to march lock step" with the federal constitution is 
commendable and appropriate where Montana's Constitution actually provides more 
protection than does its federal counterpart—and our State constitution does in many 
notable respects. Here, however, the Court has gone beyond refusing to march lock step. 
Rather, in creating from whole cloth a greater double jeopardy protection than is 
contained in the plain language of Article II, Section 25, and in its history at the 
Constitutional Convention and in the federal constitution, the majority has marched 
defiantly backwards through the parade, around the bend and into the swamp. 
TI 37 Similarly, Justice Leaphart's attempt to shore up the majority opinion is unavailing. 
While state courts interpreting their own constitutional double jeopardy clauses are 
circumscribed by the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of the double jeopardy clause 
of the Fifth Amendment to provide no less protection than does the federal constitution, 
that is not to say that even this country's highest court is in agreement that double 
jeopardy encompasses the concept of multiple punishments. 
Tf 38 Like Article II, Section 25, the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment 
refers only to "jeopardy," not punishment-*321 "nor shall any person be subject for the 
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." In his dissent in Dept. of 
Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch (1994), 511 U.S. 767, 114 S.Ct. 1937, 128 L.Ed.2d 
767, and noting this lack of textual reference to punishment, Justice Scalia traces in some 
detail the historical and jurisprudential history of the federal double jeopardy clause and 
concludes that" f[t]o be put in jeopardy1 does not remotely mean 'to be punished,'... [and 
that]... by its terms, this provision prohibits, not multiple punishments, but only multiple 
prosecutions." Kurth, 511 U.S. at 798, 803, 114 S.Ct. at 1955, 1958 (Scalia, J., dissenting, 
citing Chief Justice Stone in In re Bradley (1943), 318 U.S. 50, 63 S.Ct. 470, 87 L.Ed. 
608 and Justice Frankfurter in United States ex rel Marcus v. Hess (1943), 317 U.S. 537, 
63 S.Ct. 379, 87 L.Ed. 443). Justice Scalia points out that the belief that there is a 
multiple-punishment component to the double jeopardy clause can be traced to dictum in 
Ex parte Lange (1874), 18 Wall. 163, 21 L.Ed. 872, but that it was not until United States 
v. Halper (1989), 490 U.S. 435, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 104 L.Ed.2d 487, that the Court actually 
invalidated a legislatively authorized successive punishment on the basis of this dictum. 
Kurth, 511 U.S. at 800, 114 S.Ct. at 1956, (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
J^ 39 Halper has, of course, now been abrogated, see Hudson v. United States (1997), 522 
U.S. 93, 118 S.Ct. 488, 139 L.Ed.2d 450, and the U.S. Supreme Court has returned to its 
pre-Halper interpretation of the Double Jeopardy Clause which acknowledges a 
constitutional prohibition against multiple punishments but requires successive criminal 
prosecutions. Hudson, 522 U.S. at — , 118 S.Ct. at 493, (citing, among other cases, 
Missouri v. Hunter (1983), 459 U.S. 359, 366, 103 S.Ct. 673, 678, 74 L.Ed.2d 535, for 
the proposition that in the constitutional sense, jeopardy describes the risk that is 
traditionally associated with a criminal prosecution and then only when such occurs in 
successive proceedings). 
TJ 40 Accordingly, we necessarily come full circle. There is simply no jurisprudential 
basis for concluding that Article II, Section 25, provides any greater double jeopardy 
protection than does the Fifth Amendment, as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
And, it is precisely because the protections afforded by Article II, Section 25, are 
coextensive with the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment that our decision in 
Zabawa— which was based upon federal law, namely Missouri v. Hunter—remains 
correct. 
Tf 41 While the majority chooses to ignore the intent of the legislature in enacting the 
weapons enhancement statute, § 46-18-221, MCA, we are not at liberty to declare this 
statute unconstitutional in its application on the basis of our interpolation into Article II, 
Section 25, of language that the people themselves did not include in this constitutional 
provision when they enacted it. Indeed, if, as here, this Court can give any meaning it 
desires to a constitutional provision without any linkage to its text or history, then there 
really is no point in having a constitution at all. 
Tj 42 I dissent. 
Chief Justice J.A. TURNAGE and Justice KARLA M. GRAY concur in the foregoing 
dissent. 
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ADDENDUM O 
Not Reported in Cal.Rptr.2d, 2002 WL 66154 (Cal.App. 5 Dist.) 
Court of Appeal, Fifth District, California. 
The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Johnny Henry BRIGHT, Jr., Defendant and Appellant. 
No. F034393. 
Jan. 17,2002. 
Defendant was convicted in the Superior Court, Kern County, No. SC7661A, Lee P. 
Felice, J., of felony murder during an attempted residential robbery, second degree 
robbery, and misdemeanor assault. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeal, Wiseman, 
J., held that: (1) trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering defendant to be 
physically restrained by a react belt around his waist during trial; (2) trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion to dismiss entire jury panel; (3) 
evidence showed that defendant's statement to booking officer was made voluntarily and 
that defendant was not interrogated so that Miranda warnings were not required in order 
for statement to be admissible; and (4) prosecutor's comments during rebuttal argument 
did not constitute misconduct. 
Affirmed. 
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Lee P. Felice, Judge. 
David Joseph Macher, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 
Appellant. 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, David P. Druliner, Chief Assistant Attorney General, 
Robert R. Anderson, Assistant Attorney General, Lloyd G. Carter and Michelle L. West, 
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
OPINION 
WISEMAN, J. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
*1 By information, defendant was charged with felony murder (count 1; Pen.Code, [FN1] 
§ 187, subd. (a) & § 190.2, subd. (a)(17)), during an attempted residential robbery (count 
2; §§ 664/212.5, subd .(a)), second degree robbery (count 3; § 212.5, subd. (c)), assault 
with a firearm (count 4; § 245, subd. (a)(2)), and felon in possession of a firearm (count 
5; § 120221, subd. (a)). With respect to counts 1 and 2, it was alleged defendant 
personally used a knife in their commission. (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1).) Regarding counts 3 
and 4, it was alleged defendant used a firearm in their commission. (§ 12022.53, subd. (b) 
on count 3 & § 12022.5, subd. (a) on count 4.) Regarding all counts, it was alleged 
defendant had suffered a strike prior conviction (§ 667, subds. (c) through (j) & § 
1170.12, subds. (a) through (e)), and had served four prior prison terms. (§ 667.5, subd. 
(b)-) 
FN1. All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted. 
Defendant pled not guilty and proceeded to jury trial. During deliberations, the court 
granted the prosecution's motion to dismiss count 5 and the personal use of a firearm 
alleged as to count 3. Defendant was found guilty as charged in counts 1, 2 and 3. On 
count 4, defendant was found guilty of misdemeanor assault (§ 240) as a lesser-included 
offense. By bench trial, the court found the strike allegation true, and granted the 
prosecution's motion to dismiss the prior prison allegations. 
Probation was denied, and defendant was sentenced to prison for life without the 
possibility of parole, plus a determinate term of 11 years, calculated as follows: one year 
for the knife use on count 1, and a consecutive term of 10 years on count 3. The court 
also imposed a concurrent term of six months on count 4 and a stayed six-year term on 
count 2. 
FACTUAL HISTORY 
Murder in the course of attempted robbery (counts 1 & 2) 
On November 26, 1998, Thanksgiving Day, John Kinnaird and his girlfriend, Debra 
Young, went to bed in their Bakersfield apartment at around 9 p.m. During the night, 
Kinnaird answered a knock at the door, and Young heard a scuffle when the door opened. 
Someone told Young to come into the living room. After doing so, Young saw two men, 
one of whom was wearing a mask and holding a gun on Kinnaird, who was seated on a 
chair. The other intruder, who at one point stood next to Young, was shorter and had a 
small build. He was Caucasian, had light-colored hair that was combed back, and a Fu 
Manchu style mustache. 
Young sat across from Kinnaird, and heard the shorter man demand money from 
Kinnaird, who told him he had none. The intruder repeated his demand. When Kinnaird 
repeated that he had no money, the shorter man hit Kinnaird in the head. Kinnaird stood 
up and began to struggle with the intruder. When the gunman went to assist his 
accomplice, Young left the apartment through the front door, ran to the back of the 
apartment and started screaming. She returned a short while later after hearing the sound 
of a car leaving. She called 9-1-1 and attempted to assist Kinnaird, who was bleeding. 
Young saw a knife on the kitchen floor and a gun on the bedroom floor. Kinnaird was 
transported to the hospital, where he died as a result of stab wounds to the chest. 
*2 Young testified defendant's body type, size, and mustache were consistent with that of 
the shorter intruder. However, his hair appeared different than it did the night of the 
incident. Young testified a photograph showed a hairstyle that was longer and combed 
back, which more closely resembled that of the intruder. 
A neighbor, David Lopez, woke up when he heard a commotion next door. Lopez got up 
when he thought he heard a gunshot. He checked on his children and then looked out the 
window. He saw a man approximately 5 feet 8 inches tall, running from the apartment 
next door. The man had long, dark blond hair, and was wearing a baseball cap, jeans, and 
a flannel shirt. He ran to a dark blue car that looked like the car belonging to Lopezfs 
brother, a Chevrolet Beretta, and left. Lopez identified a photograph of a vehicle as 
looking similar to the one he saw leaving the scene. Lopez recalled telling an officer that 
he had seen the vehicle parked outside the apartments on numerous occasions. The man 
leaving also looked familiar to Lopez as someone he had seen at the next door apartment 
wearing the same ball cap and similar clothing. 
Jimmy Bond testified he was a felon, previously convicted of first-degree burglary and 
possession of a controlled substance. Prior to his testimony, he was facing forgery 
charges with a maximum exposure of 11 years in prison, but believed he would receive 
approximately 6 years. In exchange for his testimony, Bond was promised no more than 
32 months in prison, however, he ultimately received a sentence of 18 months, and the 
felony was reduced to a misdemeanor. With credits, Bond expected to serve 
approximately 12 months in jail. 
Bond had known defendant about 15 to 20 years. On Thanksgiving night, Bond, who was 
living in a converted shed outside his mother's trailer, was awakened by the sound of a 
car, and then defendant came to Bond's door. Bond answered the door and noticed a 
medium-sized blue car parked out front with someone sitting in the driver's seat. Bond let 
defendant in and defendant began talking. Defendant had blood on him and was agitated 
and upset. He told Bond that he and another man had pulled a robbery that went bad, and 
defendant ended up stabbing someone. Defendant told Bond that the victim's name was 
John. According to defendant, his partner was supposed to be holding John with the gun, 
but John attacked him. Defendant said he had a knife, which became slippery with blood. 
It slipped out of his hand and he left it at the scene. Bond allowed defendant to clean up 
the blood, which appeared fresh, by using the faucet outside. Bond gave defendant a 
towel and clean clothes. He took defendant's clothes and bagged them up, but missed a 
shirt. He told defendant he could dispose of the clothes in the dumpsters behind the trailer 
court. 
After defendant left, Bond found defendant's shirt. Bond put it in the washing machine 
and later gave it away. Bond testified he had a feeling the victim was John Kinnaird, 
whom he knew. The following day he called Kinnaird's apartment and spoke to Debra 
Young. She told him Kinnaird had been killed the night before, but did not give Bond any 
details. 
*3 Shortly after his visit, defendant called Bond and threatened him to keep quiet. Later, 
Bond was arrested and told his parole officer he had information about the Kinnaird 
murder. Bond was put in touch with the investigating officer, Detective Guiffre. Guiffre 
took a taped statement from Bond, but told him he might not even be called as a witness. 
Bond did not receive any consideration on his forgery case until after he testified at 
defendant's preliminary hearing. While Bond was in jail, defendant was placed in a cell 
next door. Defendant told Bond there was "a green light" on him, which meant an inmate 
could kill him without facing repercussions. 
Jacqueline Moore, an evidence technician with the Kern County Sheriffs Department, 
responded to the Kinnaird residence. At trial, she identified photographs of the knife and 
air gun that were found at the scene. Moore also observed quite a bit of blood. She 
examined the knife and gun for fingerprints. Although no prints were found on the knife, 
a marginal print was located on the gun. The print did not match those of defendant or 
Bond. 
The remaining counts and additional evidence regarding Kinnaird's murder 
In December of 1998, Terry Cromwell, an automobile mechanic, was working on a car in 
a garage at an apartment complex. While working on the vehicle, defendant and Bobby 
Taylor approached Cromwell and the vehicles owner. Cromwell did not know either 
individual, but defendant identified himself as "Johnny." Some time later, Cromwell 
closed the garage door and defendant interpreted it as a sign of disrespect. Defendant told 
Cromwell that he had disrespected defendant, and then asked whether he had any money. 
Defendant warned Cromwell he had stabbed a man twice in the chest, was on the run 
from the law, and would have no problem "capping" him. Defendant told Cromwell to 
empty his pockets and lifted his shirt to reveal a .38 caliber gun. Taylor tried to talk 
defendant out of robbing Cromwell, telling defendant," 'Come on. We need to get going. 
We don't need to do this.'" Cromwell gave his money to defendant. 
Defendant then made Cromwell walk to Cromwell's truck and told him to remove the 
stereo system. As Cromwell did so, defendant took the gun out and pointed it at him. 
Cromwell needed to remove one more screw, but needed a screwdriver to do so. 
Defendant went to get a screwdriver, at which time Cromwell ran to a nearby apartment 
complex and stayed there for about 30 minutes. When he returned to his truck, no one 
was there, but his wallet and driver's license were missing. A few days later, Cromwell 
reported the robbery to police and identified defendant from a photo lineup. 
Bobby Taylor testified he and defendant drove to a garage and encountered Cromwell 
working on a car. Defendant began yelling at Cromwell after defendant accused 
Cromwell of disrespecting him. Defendant then asked if Cromwell had any money. 
Taylor tried to talk defendant out of robbing Cromwell, but defendant told Taylor to stay 
out of it. Defendant told Cromwell he would "fade" him (i.e., kill him). After giving 
defendant his money, Cromwell was directed by defendant to his truck and told to 
remove his stereo system. When defendant went to get a screwdriver, Taylor aptly 
advised Cromwell, " 'You need to get the fuck out of here.'" Cromwell took off running, 
and Taylor and defendant left. 
*4 In the days following the robbery, defendant told Taylor about his involvement in the 
Kinnaird murder, telling Taylor he robbed the Kinnairds in their home. Defendant said he 
made the girl get down and slapped the victim a couple times. Defendant was "slapping 
dude around. Dude got crazy, and he hit dude twice.'" When Taylor asked defendant 
what he did with the knife, defendant said," 'Blood was slippery, Holmes,' " which 
Taylor understood to mean the knife was left behind. As for Young, defendant said, "the 
broad made a break for it." 
Taylor was originally charged with being an accessory to the robbery and receiving 
stolen property in connection with the Cromwell robbery. He also faced two counts of 
assault with a deadly weapon in a separate case. All the charges were dismissed in 
exchange for Taylor's truthful testimony in defendant's case. Taylor was being held in 
custody on a parole violation. 
On Thanksgiving in 1998, Joshua Pipkins was parked in his blue Chevy Beretta on a 
street in Oildale, talking to a girl named Tara, when Randy Starks walked up to them. At 
about the same time, defendant and his girlfriend, Trish Roberts, drove to where Pipkins 
was and spoke to him. Defendant and Roberts were in a red Nissan. Defendant asked to 
borrow Pipkins1 car to go to the store for his Nissan, which defendant claimed was not 
running well. Pipkins reluctantly allowed defendant to use his car, and defendant said he 
would be right back. Defendant never returned the car to Pipkins. 
With Starks driving defendant's red Nissan, Starks and Pipkins looked for Pipkins' 
Beretta that evening. The next day, with Starks driving, Pipkins in the back seat, and 
Mandy Patton in the front passenger seat, they continued to look for the Beretta. 
Suddenly, after crossing paths with Sheriffs Sergeant Joe Linder, who was on patrol 
driving in the opposite direction, Starks began to drive evasively. Linder began a brief 
pursuit of Starks. Starks, however, got out of the vehicle while it was moving, and fled. 
The vehicle then crashed into a fence. Pipkins explained to Linder that they were looking 
for his vehicle, which defendant had taken, and the Red Nissan belonged to defendant. 
The next time Pipkins saw his Beretta was about two weeks later, when he retrieved it 
from the sheriffs impound lot. Pipkins found some envelopes in the glove compartment 
and a bag of clothes that did not belong to him. To Pipkins1 knowledge, no one had ever 
bled on his seat. 
Criminalist Brenda Smith examined the vehicle for blood evidence. She conducted tests 
on a bloodstained portion of the passenger seat that she removed from the car. Smith 
performed a protein-typing test on the blood and determined it had properties consistent 
with Kinnaird's blood type. She testified the protein type found in the samples tested 
occurs in approximately thirty percent of the Caucasian population. 
DISCUSSION 
/. The react belt 
Defendant contends the court erred by ordering him to be physically restrained by a react 
belt around his waist during trial. Specifically, he argues the order was not based on a 
showing of manifest need. He concludes the restraint violated his right to a fair trial, the 
assistance of counsel, and his right against cruel and unusual punishment. We conclude 
the record supports a finding of manifest need for the restraint. Consequently, we find no 
abuse of discretion based on the court's order. 
*5 On August 10, 1999, the second day of in limine motions, defense counsel requested 
removal of the react belt that defendant was wearing. Defendant's counsel stated 
defendant was uncomfortable, unable to sif up straight, and was afraid of being 
accidentally electrocuted. Because he was worried, defendant could not concentrate or 
focus on his case, and felt "mentally restrained." Defense counsel also noted he was 
nervous about sitting next to his client for fear he might be electrocuted. 
Applicable law 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]" '[A] defendant cannot be subjected to physical restraints 
of any kind in the courtroom while in the jury's presence, unless there is a showing of a 
manifest need for such restraints.' [Citation.] Manifest need exists 'only upon a showing 
of unruliness, an announced intention to escape, or "[e]vidence of any nonconforming 
conduct or planned nonconforming conduct which disrupts or would disrupt the judicial 
process if unrestrained...." ' [Citations.] Although the trial court's discretion to order 
shackles is relatively narrow, appellate courts will uphold its order absent a clear showing 
of abuse. [Citations.] 
"A defendant's 'record of violence, or the fact that he is a capital defendant, cannot alone 
justify his shackling.' [Citation.] Instead, 'the Courts of Appeal have generally read Duran 
[People v. Duran (1976) 282 Cal.3d 282] as requiring that a defendant make specific 
threats of violence or escape from court or demonstrate unruly conduct in court before in-
court restraints are justified.' [Citation.] Violence while in custody or a recent history of 
escape also justifies the use of restraints. [Citations.] 
"Physical restraints during trial are discouraged for several reasons. Most important is the 
inherent risk that 'the shackling of a criminal defendant will [cause] prejudice ... in the 
minds of the jurors. When a defendant is charged with any crime, and particularly if he is 
accused of a violent crime, his appearance before the jury in shackles is likely to lead the 
jurors to infer that he is a violent person disposed to commit crimes of the type alleged.' 
[Citations.] 
"Shackling is also discouraged because it may impair a defendant's ability to participate 
in his or her defense. The 'affront to human dignity' caused by shackles may impair the 
defendant's mental faculties by confusing or embarrassing him, or by inflicting pain. 
Shackles may also prevent effective communication with counsel and discourage a 
defendant from testifying. [Citations .] Finally,'... physical restraints should be used as a 
last resort... because "the use of this technique is itself something of an affront to the 
very dignity and decorum of judicial proceedings that the judge is seeking to uphold." 
[Citation.]' [Citation.]" {People v. Garcia (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1349, 1355-1356, 66 
Cal.Rptr.2d 350, fn. omitted.) 
Garcia also held the traditional requirements for physical restraints do not apply to react 
belts because they differ significantly from traditional devices such as handcuffs, leg 
irons, waist chains and gags. The court noted the react belt does not restrain physical 
movement and cannot be seen by the jurors. Therefore, jurors cannot draw inferences 
about the wearer's guilt or propensity for violence. In addition, the belt does not diminish 
courtroom decorum, was less likely to discourage the wearer from testifying, and should 
not cause confusion, embarrassment or humiliation. {People v. Garcia, supra, 56 
Cal.App.4th at p. 1356, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 350.) The court then adopted a standard of good 
cause based on the totality of the circumstances, to be applied by a court when exercising 
its discretion on whether to allow the use of a react belt. Whether a react belt is a physical 
restraint subject to the same standard applicable to other types of physical restraints, as 
articulated in People v. Duran (1976) 16 Cal.3d 282, 127 Cal.Rptr. 618, 545 P.2d 1322, 
is currently under review in the Supreme Court. (See People v. Mar (2000) 77 
Cal.App.4th 1284, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 771, review granted June 2, 2000, S086611.) We need 
not consider or determine whether the Garcia standard should apply here because even 
under Duran's stricter standard of "manifest need," there was no abuse of discretion. 
Facts 
*6 Use of the react belt on defendant was supported by two recent incident reports, 
involving violent conduct by defendant while housed awaiting trial. The first was dated 
April 23, 1999, and reported defendant's dayroom inmates had made numerous 
complaints about him. Defendant reportedly would yell threats, and threw oranges, bars 
of soap and wet toilet paper at them. Defendant had been caught "possessing strikers and 
covering the cell intercom," which prevented officers from hearing exactly what 
defendant was yelling. As a result, defendant was re-housed with "keep aways placed on 
him" from three named inmates. 
The second report was dated July 1, 1999. Correctional Officer Smith approached 
defendant to notify him he had a pending disciplinary hearing. Defendant began to argue 
with Smith, and became agitated. Smith gave defendant the notification form to sign, and 
defendant tore it in half, stepped back with his right leg, pulled back his clenched right 
hand, and appeared ready to strike Smith. For his safety, Smith immediately attempted to 
apply a twist lock to his left arm. They struggled to the ground with Smith in control of 
defendant's left arm until backup officers arrived. As a result, Smith suffered injuries to 
his ankle and thumb. 
In addition, the court knew that defendant was a gang member belonging to the Nazi Low 
Riders (NLR) and that some witnesses had been threatened. Many of the witnesses were 
former friends of defendant that had turned state's evidence to have charges against them 
reduced or dismissed. 
Analysis 
In exercising its discretion, the court reasoned: 
".... In this case we have actual indication that there have been threats, ftf] In addition to 
that, we have these two instances of apparent threats of violence or actual violence. I 
mean, he's throwing things back in April while in custody. [%].... [^ J] So given that this 
case involves at least two of these individuals who are associates of your client—one of 
whom he actually is supposedly, I guess, involved in a robbery with who have now 
turned on him and in consideration of plea bargains they have received are now testifying 
against him—given the indication that there have been rumors of threats, given his 
conduct while in custody, I'm going to allow him to be belted, [%\ I want to assure the 
Defendant and assure you, [defense counsel], that the Defendant is going to be able to 
move his hands, his legs, his body, in whatever manner is necessary to communicate to 
you And as I indicated, I've instructed [the bailiff] that the button is not to be 
activated unless it is clear to him that the Defendant is going to do something of a violent 
nature." 
After this ruling, defense counsel acknowledged he had been informed that the button 
activating the react belt was changed to avoid accidental shocking. The court noted again 
that defendant need not be concerned about the react belt "unless, of course, he intends to 
do something of a violent nature ...." 
*7 [10] Defendant contends the court abused its discretion in denying his request to 
remove the react belt during trial. However, "abuse of discretion implies arbitrary 
determination, capricious disposition or whimsical thinking where the court exceeds all 
bounds of reason, all of the circumstances being considered." (People v. Pitcock (1982) 
134 Cal.App.3d 795, 801, 184 Cal.Rptr. 772.) In light of the situation and the comfs 
reasoning, we cannot say the court abused its discretion. Defendant had recently engaged 
in violent conduct against a correctional officer, and on another occasion, was violent 
toward inmates, both while in custody awaiting trial. As noted in Garcia, supra, 56 
Cal.App.4th 1349, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 350, violence while in custody justifies the use of 
restraints. (See also People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1215, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49, 
920 P.2d 1254 [false imprisonment of a correctional officer and escape attempts justified 
shackling] People v. Sheldon (1989) 48 Cal.3d 935, 945-946, 258 Cal.Rptr. 242, 771 P.2d 
1330 [defendant's assaults on five inmates, the fact he was facing a life prison term in 
Nevada, and an officer's opinion that he posed a high escape risk justified shackling].) 
Further, the fact the witnesses testifying against defendant were friends who turned on 
him, is a significant factor supporting restraints under Garcia. This factor weighs even 
heavier here because, unlike Garcia, some of these witnesses received threats. In 
combination with defendant's in-custody violence, the court could reasonably conclude 
there was a manifest need for use of the react belt on defendant during trial. 
[11] Defendant notes that a react belt, like traditional leg irons, compromises his self-
respect. In fact, "it is reasonable to conclude the blow to the accused's sense of well-being 
is greater with a react belt." Defendant cites no authority in support of this position. In the 
absence of binding California or United States Supreme Court authority holding 
otherwise, we decline to find the use of a react belt raises constitutional issues different 
than those presented with other "low-tech" forms of personal restraint. Defendant does 
not have a constitutional right to select the type of physical restraints he prefers. 
Defendant did not argue to the trial court that a different restraint should be used in lieu 
of the react belt. To the extent he does so for the first time on appeal, we reject his 
position. He fails to cite to any evidence which indicates that wearing the react belt 
affected his demeanor, mental capacity, or ability to fully participate in his trial. Further, 
our independent review of the record fails to support this contention. 
Finally, defendant points out the belt was visible to trial counsel when defendant stood 
up. Further, during trial, juror number 10 asked the bailiff if defendant was wearing a 
"shock belt." It is unclear, however, what defendant is contending with respect to these 
observations. He disavows that he is claiming prejudice as a result of juror number 10's 
inquiry, a claim that would not be supported by the record. [FN2] Instead, he explains: 
FN2. Defendant was given the option of having juror 10 dismissed from the jury, but 
chose to not exercise that option. Juror 10 stated he had not discussed the possibility that 
defendant was wearing a react belt with the other jurors, and no others had mentioned 
anything to him about it. Juror 10 explained he thought it was simply a safety device, 
noting one witness was wearing handcuffs. He thought the reason for the device was 
probably because the defendant was in custody. The court admonished the juror not to 
consider the belt on the issue of guilt and to not discuss it with the other jurors. In 
addition, defense counsel was permitted to fashion a jury instruction advising the jury 
that security measures taken at trial were 
normal for every case. 
*8 "Rather than a claim of error as to Juror No. 10, appellant's argument is based upon 
the [trial] court's mistaken decision to have Bright restrained in a react belt during trial. 
One strand of the assignment of error is the record on appeal supports an inference the 
restraint was apparent to the jury rather than hidden." 
Defendant's contention is simply one aspect of his claim that the court abused its 
discretion by ordering use of the react belt. However, as previously discussed, there was 
no abuse here because the circumstances supported the court's finding of a manifest need 
for restraints. Whether traditional shackles should have been used, as opposed to the belt, 
which is generally considered less visible than leg irons, handcuffs or waist chains, was 
not raised at trial. Again, to the extent defendant is contending for the first time on appeal 
that he should have been permitted to select a different security device than that ordered 
by the court, we reject it. 
II. The motion to strike the jury panel 
Defendant contends the court erred by denying his motion to strike the jury panel after 
three panel members made statements during voir dire that defendant argues were 
prejudicial and inflammatory. He argues these comments biased the jury panel and 
denied him a fair trial before an impartial jury. 
Voir dire 
At the start of voir dire on August 10, 1999, Juror No. 190073475, a parole agent and 
former deputy sheriff was asked if he knew defendant's counsel. He responded that he 
knew one attorney, as well as defendant, in his professional capacity. The court asked, "Is 
there anything about your contacts with either of these individuals that might influence 
you as a juror in this case." He responded affirmatively, and both attorneys stipulated he 
could be excused. 
Later in the day, Juror No. 190099712 stated, "I know of Mr. Bright. I work for the 
Department of Corrections." The court promptly excused her. 
[12] Finally, Juror No. 190072096, when asked by the court how he would answer earlier 
questions, stated: 
"THE JUROR:.... I've got a son that's probably not been violent but—well, he's not been 
violent, but he's the white representative of Soledad Prison, and he's got tattoos just like 
this young man, and it really does bother me. 
"THE COURT: You feel that based on the tattoos, that you would be unable to be fair 
and impartial? 
"THE JUROR: I don't think based on the tattoos. I just—the situation probably, yeah. 
"THE COURT: Okay. Mr. (190072096), we're going to send you back to the jury holding 
room." 
The court then recessed for the afternoon and defendant made a motion to strike the jury 
panel. Defendant argued the cumulative effect of these three jurors' comments was to 
prejudice the jury panel because the jurors had heard defendant was in prison and in a 
white supremacist gang. [FN3] The court denied the motion, finding the comments did 
not warrant striking the panel and starting the process all over again. 
FN3. Respondent argues defendant's claim that his case was not heard by an impartial 
jury in violation of both the Federal and State Constitutions was waived because in his 
motion to strike the jury panel, counsel failed to state a constitutional basis. We reject this 
contention. Defendant did not state the motion was based on common law principles or 
statutory grounds for the right to an impartial jury. Further, it is questionable whether 
there are any bases for the right to an impartial jury other than those provided for by our 
Federal and State Constitutions. As a result, the fact the motion was not expressly based 
on constitutional grounds is inconsequential. 
Standard of review 
*9 [13] [14] "A motion for mistrial presupposes error plus incurable prejudice." {People 
v. Gatlin (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 31, 38, 257 Cal.Rptr. 171.) "Whether a particular 
incident is incurably prejudicial is by its nature a speculative matter, and the trial court is 
vested with considerable discretion in ruling on mistrial motions.11 {People v. Haskett 
(1982) 30 Cal.3d 841, 854, 180 Cal.Rptr. 640, 640 P.2d 776.) In People v. Martinez 
(1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1456, 1466-1467, 279 Cal.Rptr. 858, we held: 
"Just as a finder of fact is in a better position than the reviewing court to judge the 
credibility of a witness, the trial judge is in a better position to gauge the level of bias and 
prejudice created by juror comments 
"The conclusion of a trial judge on the question of individual juror bias and prejudice is 
entitled to great deference and is reversed on appeal only upon a clear showing of abuse 
of discretion. [Citations.] We adopt the same standard for claims of group bias " 
Analysis 
[15] In Martinez, we faced a similar issue: 
"Appellant argues the trial court had an obligation to intervene at some point in order to 
stop the prejudicial comments from individual jurors. He cites for our guidance numerous 
cases from courts outside California. [Citations.] We have reviewed each of these 
authorities and find nothing in them that advances our analysis. As appellant 
acknowledges, in all but one of the foregoing cases ,... the trial court's exercise of 
discretion in denying defendant's motion to discharge the jury panel was affirmed on 
appeal " {People v. Martinez, supra, 228 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1464-1465, 279 Cal.Rptr. 
858.) 
As in Martinez, we conclude under the totality of the circumstances that the court did not 
abuse its discretion when it denied defendant's motion to dismiss the entire jury panel. 
The trial judge was in a better position to gauge the level of bias and prejudice created by 
the jurors' comments. To determine the possible prejudice from the cold record on appeal 
requires that we engage in speculation. Although defendant argues Juror No. 190072096 
labeled him as a white supremacist because of his tattoos, the reference to his son being a 
white representative of Soledad does not necessarily support this claim. While it is true 
the jury likely had figured out defendant had previously been in prison, the comments did 
not indicate he was particularly notorious. In any event, the jury already knew or was 
going to be informed, that defendant had a prior felony conviction. In addition, 
defendant's tattoos on his face and neck, and the teardrop tattoo below his eye, were 
likely to clue the jury that defendant had been in prison. Prior to the comments of the last 
two jurors, both attorneys had broached the subject of defendant's tattoos. They asked 
whether the jurors might be biased against defendant simply because of the tattoos, and 
cautioned against it. 
Further, after the denial of defendant's mistrial motion, defense counsel continued to 
question the jurors regarding prejudices they might harbor against defendant because of 
his tattoos and because he was a convicted felon. In addition, the court asked the 
prospective jurors whether they could put their personal feelings aside and be fair and 
impartial to both sides. The jurors all responded they could do so. 
* 10 [16] Finally, before voir dire and trial, the court admonished the jurors not to 
consider the fact defendant was arrested and accused of the crimes as evidence of guilt. 
The court instructed: 
"You must base your decisions in thi? case on the facts and the law as I instruct you. 
[1f]— [1f] You must not be influenced by pity for a defendant or by prejudice against him. 
You must not be biased against the Defendant because he has been arrested for this 
offense, charged with a crime, or brought to trial. None of these circumstances is 
evidence of guilt, and you must not infer or assume from any or all of them that he is 
more likely to be guilty than not guilty. You must not be influenced by mere sentiment, 
conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion, or public feeling. Both the 
People and the Defendant have a right to expect that you will conscientiously consider 
and weigh the evidence, apply the law, and reach a just verdict regardless of the 
consequences." 
In light of the circumstances, the court did not abuse its discretion by denying the mistrial 
motion. Even if a danger existed that the empanelled jury would improperly consider the 
fact defendant had been previously sentenced to prison, this potential for prejudice was 
averted by admonitions made by the court and counsel. We presume the jury followed the 
court's instructions. {People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal,4th 701, 773, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 203, 
976 P.2d 754.) And, nothing in the record leads us to believe the jurors did not heed the 
court's instructions (ibid.), or were unable to set aside their biases. (People v. Martinez, 
supra, 228 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1466-1467, 279 Cal.Rptr. 858.) 
III. Admission of defendant's booking statement 
Defendant contends the court erred by admitting statements that he made while in 
custody in Colorado because the officer violated his rights under Miranda v. Arizona 
(1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (Miranda). We reject this 
contention. 
Evidence at suppression motion hearing 
On December 30, 1998, Officer Travis Carpenter was working at the Archuleta County 
Jail. On that day, Carpenter was defendant's booking officer, and asked him routine 
booking questions. These included questions regarding his name, date of birth, and social 
security number. Carpenter also asked if defendant wanted a public defender, his 
education level, and various medical questions, including whether defendant was a 
suicide risk. During the booking, defendant asked with whom he was going to be celled. 
Carpenter responded, " There is a possibility you will be put in a cell block with a 
Southern Ute Indian or Hispanic,' and that we hardly have any African-Americans in our 
town, much less in our jail." During the booking, defendant was allowed to take a 
shower. Upon leaving the shower, Carpenter did not ask defendant any questions. 
However, defendant volunteered," 'I won't be put in a cell block with any child molesters 
or anything, will I, because I'm already going away a long time for homicide; so it 
wouldn't matter much what I do.'" 
* 11 Defendant testified that Carpenter asked him about his tattoos, and what NLR meant. 
Defendant was apparently concerned about being housed with someone not of his own 
race. Also, because his case had received some publicity, he was concerned about a 
cellmate falsely claiming he had made incriminating statements. Defendant 
acknowledged he might have told Carpenter he did not want to be put in a cell with child 
molesters. However, defendant denied saying he was going away for a long time for a 
homicide. 
The prosecutor only sought admission of the statement defendant made upon leaving the 
shower. The court ruled the statement was admissible as a voluntary statement that was 
not the product of custodial interrogation. 
Standard of review 
[17] The standard of review was recently stated in People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 
1194-1195, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 69, 5 P.3d 130: 
"In considering a claim that a statement or confession is inadmissible because it was 
obtained in violation of a defendant's rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 
436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, the scope of our review is well established.' "We 
must accept the trial court's resolution of disputed facts and inferences, and its 
evaluations of credibility, if they are substantially supported. [Citations.] However, we 
must independently determine from the undisputed facts, and those properly found by the 
trial court, whether the challenged statement was illegally obtained." ' {People v. 
Bradford, supra, 14 CaUth at p. 1033, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 225, 929 P.2d 544.) 'We apply 
federal standards in reviewing defendant's claim that the challenged statements were 
elicited from him in violation of Miranda.' (Ibid.)" 
Where the evidence is uncontradicted, we review the court's finding that no interrogation 
occurred during the booking process by exercising our independent judgment. (People v. 
Sims (1993) 5 Cal.4th 405, 440, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 537, 853 P.2d 992) 
[18] [19] Interrogation consists of words or actions on the part of the police that they 
should know are "reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response." (Rhode Island v. 
Innis (1980) 446 U.S. 291, 303, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297.) However, if the 
defendant initiates a statement to police, "nothing in the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments ... prohibits] the police from merely listening to his voluntary, volunteered 
statements and using them against him at the trial." (Edwards v. Arizona (1980) 451 U.S. 
477, 485, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378.) 
Analysis 
[20] Defendant contends the statement he made after coming out of the shower was the 
product of custodial interrogation. He does not argue Carpenter said anything to him or 
took any action that was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. Instead, he 
contends he was still operating under the effects of an earlier question about his tattoos. 
This position is not supported by any testimony. According to Carpenter, he did not ask 
defendant about his tattoos. According to defendant, his statement was made when 
Carpenter asked him booking questions and about his NLR tattoo. Consequently, his 
argument that he was still responding to the earlier inquiry about his tattoo when he made 
the challenged statement is not supported by the record. 
* 12 [21] [22] In any event, the court's resolution of disputed facts and its evaluations of 
credibility are substantially supported by Carpenter's testimony. {People v. Box, supra, 23 
Cal.4th at p. 1195, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 69, 5 P.3d 130.) Carpenter never asked defendant 
about his tattoo, and defendant made a spontaneous statement as he left the shower. 
Miranda does not preclude officers from listening to volunteered statements and using 
them against the defendant at trial. {People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 651, 286 
Cal.Rptr. 801, 818 P.2d 84 [defendant's statements while in custody and being 
transported from Japan to the U.S. were admissible where defendant opened and directed 
the discussion].) In the absence of custodial interrogation, "[a]ny statement given freely 
and voluntarily without any compelling influences is, of course, admissible in evidence." 
{Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 478.)" 'Volunteered statements of any kind 
are not barred by the Fifth Amendment' or subject to the prophylactic requirements of 
Miranda. [Citations.]" {People v. Ray (1996) 13 CaUth 313, 337, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 296, 
914P.2d846.) 
Although it is undisputed that defendant was in custody when he made the statement, the 
court found there was no interrogation and this finding is supported by substantial 
evidence. {People v. Mickey, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 651, 286 Cal.Rptr. 801, 818 P.2d 84.) 
There was no express questioning by Carpenter, and Carpenter did not do anything likely 
to elicit an incriminating response. Consequently, Miranda did not come into play. {Ibid.) 
IV. Alleged prosecutorial misconduct 
Defendant contends the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct by suggesting that 
defendant's girlfriend, Trish Roberts, could have been the taller suspect who committed 
the crime with defendant. Although defendant failed to object at trial or request an 
admonition, he argues the court erred when it denied the motion for a new trial on this 
ground. We reject the contention. 
Applicable law 
[23] [24] [25] "Improper remarks by a prosecutor can ' "so infect [ ] the trial with 
unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process."' [Citations.]" 
{People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 969, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183.) "But 
conduct by a prosecutor that does not render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair is 
prosecutorial misconduct under state law only if it involves " ' "the use of deceptive or 
reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade either the court or the jury."'" {People v. 
Espinosa (1992) 3 CaUth 806, 820, 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 682, 838 P.2d 204; People v. Price 
(1991) 1 CaUth 324, 447, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 821P.2d 610.) The ultimate question is 
whether it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the defendant would 
have occurred had the prosecutor refrained from the alleged misconduct. (E.g., People v. 
Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 831, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 347, 919 P.2d 1280.) 
[26] [27]" fAs a general rule a defendant may not complain on appeal of prosecutorial 
misconduct unless in a timely fashion—and on the same ground— the defendant made an 
assignment of misconduct and requested that the jury be admonished to disregard the 
impropriety. [Citation .]' [Citation.]" {People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th at p. 800, 820, 72 
Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673.) One exception to this rule excuses a defendant from "the 
necessity of either a timely objection and/or a request for admonition if either would be 
futile. [Citations.]" (Ibid.) "[In addition,] the absence of a request for a curative 
admonition does not forfeit the issue for appeal if 'the court immediately overrules an 
objection to alleged prosecutorial misconduct [and as a consequence] the defendant has 
no opportunity to make such a request.' [Citations.]" (People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at 
p. 820-821, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673.) 
* 13 [28] Finally, to prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct based on remarks to 
the jury, defendant must show a reasonable likelihood the jury understood or applied the 
complained-of comments in an improper or erroneous manner. (People v. Berryman 
(1992) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1072, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 867, 864 P.2d 40, disapproved on other 
grounds in People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 823, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673.) 
In conducting this inquiry, "we do not lightly infer" that the jury drew the most damaging 
rather than the least damaging meaning from the prosecutor's statements. (People v. 
Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1192, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268, 824 P.2d 1315.) 
Analysis 
[29] Defendant failed to object to the prosecutor's argument in a timely manner, thus 
depriving the court of an opportunity to admonish the jury to disregard the alleged 
impropriety. Consequently, the issue is waived. 
Defendant argues he raised the issue in a motion for mistrial and a motion for new trial, 
and concludes, "Surely appellant can take issue with the lower court's rulings on the 
defense motions." We agree. 
We have previously set forth the standard of review: "A motion for mistrial presupposes 
error plus incurable prejudice." (People v. Gatlin, supra, 209 Cal.App.3d at p. 38, 257 
Cal.Rptr. 171.) "Whether a particular incident is incurably prejudicial is by its nature a 
speculative matter, and the trial court is vested with considerable discretion in ruling on 
mistrial motions." (People v. Haskett, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 854, 180 Cal.Rptr. 640, 640 
P.2d 776.) 
[30] [31] Once a verdict has been rendered^ upon the defendant's application the court 
may grant a new trial, but only under limited circumstances. (Pen.Code, § 1181; but see 
People v. Whittington (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 806, 821, fn. 7, 141 Cal.Rptr. 742 [motion 
for new trial can be granted either on the basis of one of enumerated statutory grounds or 
on nonstatutory grounds where failure to do so would result in miscarriage of justice].) 
"A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on a motion for a new trial, and there is a 
strong presumption that it properly exercised that discretion.f "The determination of a 
motion for a new trial rests so completely within the court's discretion that its action will 
not be disturbed unless a manifest and unmistakable abuse of discretion clearly appears." 
f
 [Citation.]" (People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 524, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 826, 896 P.2d 
119; accord People v. Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1318, 248 Cal.Rptr. 834, 756 P.2d 
221.) 
[32] In this case, the court found the alleged misconduct was waived because no timely 
objection was made which would have permitted it to take appropriate action in a timely 
manner. In light of the failure to object, the court then considered "was the argument such 
that it prejudiced the Defendant and denied him a fair trial? And I conclude that it did 
not." We hold the court's finding that no prejudice ensued as a result of the prosecutor's 
alleged misconduct is supported by the record. Therefore it did not abuse its discretion in 
denying defendant's mistrial motion and motion for new trial. 
The prosecutor's rebuttal argument was made after defense counsel argued: 
* 14 "[I]f we believe Mr. Pipkins, Trish Roberts, who is supposed to be Mr. Bright's 
girlfriend, is in the car when they leave that evening before the homicide. And, look, Mr. 
Pipkins—they find these envelopes in the car. HI].... [If]—- That was one of the three that 
was found in Mr. Pipkins' car, one they did not find Mr. Bright's print on, and there's no 
evidence they found Trisha Roberts' prints on it. [%]..., flf] All I'm saying is there is some 
questionable meaning to these envelopes, and you have to decide if, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, the fact they found these envelopes in this car, according to Mr. Pipkins, proves 
somehow Trisha Roberts was in that car. 
"First of all, if you assume that it's been proven to you beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Mr. Bright is even Trisha Roberts' girlfriend, that's what has to be proved first. The only 
one that said that was Mr. Pipkins, that he was with her or something to that effect." In 
closing argument the prosecutor stated: 
"Ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Lopez is looking at the back. He doesn't see a bandanna or 
mask on the front. If he sees someone five eight or five nine, he's seeing the taller person. 
If he sees someone getting in the driver's seat, he's not seeing Mr. Bright. He may have 
even seen Trish Roberts. And if he says, 'You know, it may have been someone I've seen 
before,' he's not talking about recognizing the face. He's talking about an overall form 
he's seeing fleeing [at] night from the back. Maybe he did mistake it with somebody else 
who had been there before. Easy enough to do." 
Contrary to defendant's assessment, we do not view the matter as presenting a close case. 
The evidence defendant stabbed Kinnaird was strong. Further, the jury was instructed the 
attorneys' statements were not evidence. The bottom line is, it is not reasonably probable 
that but for the prosecutor's brief rebuttal argument, defendant would have received a 
more favorable result. Consequently, there was no abuse of discretion in denying 
defendant's motions. The prosecutor's argument did not result in an unfair trial or a 
miscarriage of justice in light of all the evidence. 
V. Separate punishment for robbery and assault convictions 
Defendant's last contention is the court erred by imposing separate punishment for his 
convictions for the robbery (count 3) and assault (count 4) of Terry Cromwell. 
Respondent appropriately concedes the sentence on count 4 violated section 654. 
[33] The record reflects the robbery and assault convictions stemmed from the same 
indivisible course of conduct, which was defendant's robbery of Cromwell with a firearm. 
As a result, the concurrent term imposed on the assault conviction violated section 654. 
{People v Brown (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1409, 1427, 261 Cal.Rptr. 262, disapproved on 
other grounds in People v Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 628, fn. 10, 276 Cal.Rptr. 874, 
802 P.2d 376.) We modify the judgment by ordering the sentence imposed on count 4 be 
stayed. {People v Martinez (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 727, 736, 217 Cal.Rptr. 546.) 
DISPOSITION 
* 15 The concurrent term imposed on count 4 is ordered stayed pursuant to section 654. 
The court shall prepare an amended abstract of judgment to reflect this modification, and 
forward a copy to the appropriate authorities. In all other respects the judgment is 
affirmed. 
WE CONCUR: VARTABEDIAN, Acting P.J., and LEVY, J. 
People v. Bright 2002 WL 66154, * 15 (Cal.App. 5 Dist.) (Cal App. 5 Dist.,2002) 
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Defendant was convicted in the Superior Court, Riverside County, No. CR 64075, Dennis 
A. McConaghy, J., of two murders, one attempted murder, and related crimes. Defendant 
appealed. The Court of Appeal, Gaut, J., held that juror who refused to deliberate was 
properly dismissed. 
Affirmed. 
Proper remedy for juror's refusal to deliberate in murder case was to dismiss juror and 
seat an alternate, rather than to grant a mistrial; evidence did not support defendant's 
contention that juror was dismissed because she doubted the sufficiency of the evidence 
and was lone holdout, but, rather, juror's complaints focused on how others treated her 
and what she perceived as instances of jury misconduct. 
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Dennis A. McConaghy, Judge. 
Affirmed. 
Roberta K. Thyfault, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 
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Gary W. Schons, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Raquel M. Gonzalez, Supervising 
Deputy Attorney General, and Elizabeth S. Voorhies, Deputy Attorney General, for 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
OPINION 
GAUT, J. 
1. Introduction 
* 1 In July 1995, three men gained entry to a Moreno Valley house, seeking money Gary 
Lee Williams had obtained from bank and credit union robberies. The men killed Gary 
Williams and his father, Roscoe Williams, by slitting their throats. The men also 
threatened and assaulted Conya Lofton, Gary Williams's girlfriend, and cut her throat. 
Lofton survived and identified two of the assailants as defendant Ronald Edward Walker, 
Jr. and his cousin, codefendant Rob Williams. The third man was not identified. 
Defendant argued that Lofton misidentified him and that he was at a party in Los Angeles 
at the time of the crimes. Codefendant Rob Williams was not tried in this case. 
A jury convicted defendant of two murders, one attempted murder, and related crimes. 
Defendant is serving two concurrent life sentences without parole, one concurrent life 
sentence with the possibility of parole; and a consecutive four-year enhancement. 
On appeal, defendant contends the court erred by dismissing a juror. In particular, he 
maintains the court should have questioned all the jurors, not just the dismissed juror, and 
should have declared a mistrial instead of dismissing the juror and seating an alternate. 
We hold the court acted within its discretion in dismissing the recalcitrant juror and in 
denying the defense motion for mistrial. 
2. Procedural Background 
Jury deliberations began on Monday, August 28, 2000. On Wednesday, August 30, after 
the jury had been dismissed for the day and excused until Tuesday, September 5, Juror 
No. 4 called the court clerk, sobbing and asking to be relieved from jury duty. On 
Thursday, August 31, the court convened with counsel and Juror No. 4 to discuss the 
matter. The court first warned the juror that she should not reveal anything about the jury 
vote but the court asked her why she did not want to return to deliberations. The juror 
responded that the jury instructions were being disregarded and that she was being 
attacked, derided, and insulted. The defense attorney suggested the juror may have been 
ridiculed because she was a lesbian. Upon further inquiry from the court, Juror No. 4 said 
that she was part of a marriage-like relationship in which she did not work. Another juror 
had commented to Juror No. 4 that ffshe couldn't afford to live off $15 a day, unlike some 
people who had the luxury of being supported." The court ordered Juror No. 4 to return 
on September 5 for further consideration. 
On September 5, the court interviewed Juror No. 4 again. She complained some of the 
jurors had made racially derogatory remarks, referring to codefendant Rob Williams as 
Mone ugly mother," and had speculated about whether defendant's family, described as 
"those kind of people," was poorer than the victims' family. She also accused one juror of 
prejudging the case and another of asserting that, in the absence of an alibi defense, 
defendant was guilty. She said the jurors had wondered about when and if codefendant 
Rob Williams was going to be tried separately from defendant. Someone explained that a 
teardrop tattoo, like Rob Williams displayed, meant that he was a gang member who had 
committed murder. Juror No. 4 also accused another juror of looking on the internet for 
the location of the house where the crimes occurred. 
*2 Outside her presence, the court analyzed her comments and discounted them as not 
reflecting racial bias. The judge called her "thin-skinned." He then remonstrated with her 
about a juror's obligation and asked if she could return, to deliberations. Juror No. 4 
responded by crying and stating repeatedly that she felt uncomfortable with and was 
insulted and ignored by her fellow jurors. Finally, she grudgingly conceded she could 
deliberate if forced by the court and she left the courtroom. The prosecution pressed for 
the court to discharge her. Shortly after leaving, the juror returned to announce, "I will 
not deliberate." Defense counsel asked the court to declare a mistrial. The court then 
decided Juror No. 4 was refusing to deliberate and should be dismissed and replaced by 
an alternate. 
At 1:15 p.m. on September 5, the court instructed the reconstituted jury to start 
deliberations again. The court admonished the jury to avoid personal attacks, not to look 
at the internet, not to compare the families of the victims and the defendant, not to 
comment on the appearance of a defendant or codefendant, and not to speculate about the 
trial of codefendant Rob Williams. The court emphasized that race was not to be 
considered. 
The jury then reached a verdict at 11:15 a.m. on September 6. 
3. Discussion 
A juror can be dismissed for failing to deliberate. [FNl] We review the trial court's 
decision to discharge a juror and to seat an alternate for abuse of discretion. [FN2] 
Defendant argues the subject juror was willing and able to deliberate but that the court 
"forced her into declaring that she would refuse to deliberate.11 
FNl. Penal Code section 1089; People v Cleveland(2001) 25 Cal.4th 466, 474, 485, 106 
Cal.Rptr.2d313,21P.3dl225. 
FN2. People v Cleveland, supra, 25 Cal.4th at page 474, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 313, 21 P.3d 
1225. 
Defendant relies primarily on People v Cleveland, [FN3] a recent California Supreme 
Court case in which 11 jurors had complained about the twelfth juror and the trial court 
discharged him. The appellate court reversed on the grounds the trial court had not 
developed a sufficient record of the dismissed juror's failure to deliberate. [FN4] The 
Supreme Court agreed, holding that the record did not show a failure to deliberate. Rather 
the record reflected that "the juror simply viewed the evidence differently from the way 
the rest of the jury viewed it.... ft|]... ft}] It is possible that Juror No. 1 employed faulty 
logic and reached an 'incorrect1 result, but it cannot properly be said that he refused to 
deliberate. Juror No. 1 participated in deliberations, attempting to explain, however 
inarticulately, the basis for his conclusion that the evidence was insufficient to prove an 
attempted robbery, and he listened, even if less than sympathetically, to the contrary 
views of his fellow jurors, ftj] Under these circumstances, we conclude that the trial court 
abused its discretion in excusing Juror No. 1. This error is prejudicial and requires 
reversal of the judgment. [Citation.]" [FN5] 
FN3. People v. Cleveland, supra, 25 Cal.4th at page 485, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 313, 21 P.3d 
1225. 
FN4. People v Cleveland, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pages 473, 474, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 313, 21 
P.3d 1225. 
FN5. People v. Cleveland, supra, 25 Cal.4th at page 486, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 313, 21 P.3d 
1225. 
[1] The present case, however, differs from Cleveland because it does not involve a 
single juror who is the object of complaints by the rest of the jury. No jurors accused 
Juror No. 4 of not deliberating. Instead, Juror No. 4 herself persistently and emotionally 
demanded to be removed from the jury. She expressly and emphatically refused to 
deliberate. For that reason, it was not important for the court to question the other jurors. 
In similar circumstances, where a juror feels intimidated or is too emotionally distraught 
to proceed, other appellate courts have upheld the dismissal of a juror. [FN6] Here, the 
court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Juror No. 4 from the jury. 
FN6. People v. Collins (1976) 17 Cal.3d 687, 696, 131 Cal.Rptr. 782, 552 P.2d 742; 
People v. Warren (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 324, 327, 221 Cal.Rptr. 768. 
*3 [2] In a related argument, defendant also contends the court did not sufficiently 
investigate Juror No. 4's complaints about jury misconduct, presumably as a reason to 
dismiss a different juror than Juror No. 4. But the court did investigate, first, when it 
questioned Juror No. 4 and, second, after her dismissal, when it interrogated the 
reconstituted jury about some of her accusations. The court did not abuse its discretion by 
the manner and method in which it undertook its investigation of possible juror 
misconduct. [FN7] 
FN7. People v. Castorena (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1051, 1065, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 151. 
[3] Finally, defendant asserts the proper remedy was to grant his mistrial motion, not to 
dismiss Juror No. 4 and seat an alternate. We disagree. Defendant argues Juror No. 4 was 
impermissibly dismissed because she doubted the sufficiency of the evidence and she was 
a lone holdout juror under attack by the majority. There is little or no evidence to support 
this interpretation of the record. There was no discussion about Juror No. 4fs view of the 
evidence. Her complaints focused on how the others treated her and what she perceived 
as instances of jury misconduct. Again, under these factual circumstances, the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed Juror No. 4, seated an alternate, and 
ordered the jury to continue deliberating. 
3. Disposition 
The judgment is affirmed. 
We concur: McKINSTER, Acting P.J., and WARD, J. 
Cal.App. 4 Dist.,2002. 
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